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STANDING OUTSIDE OF ARTICLE III 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that standing doctrine is a “bedrock” re-
quirement only of Article III. Accordingly, both jurists and scholars have assumed 
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that the standing of the executive branch and the legislature, like that of other 
parties, depends solely on Article III. But I argue that these commentators have 
overlooked a basic constitutional principle: federal institutions must have affirma-
tive authority for their actions, including the power to bring suit or appeal in 
federal court. Article III defines the federal “judicial Power” and does not purport 
to confer any authority on the executive branch or the legislature. Executive and 
legislative standing instead depend in large part on the provisions conferring power 
on those institutions—principally, Article II and Article I. This basic insight has 
important implications. I argue that the Take Care Clause of Article II helps both 
to explain the breadth and to define the limits of executive standing. The executive 
branch has standing only insofar as it has an Article II power and duty to enforce 
and defend federal law on behalf of the federal government. The Take Care Clause 
does not, however, confer standing when the executive no longer asserts that law-
enforcement interest—when it declines to defend a federal law. Article I, for its 
part, does not confer any power on Congress to enforce or defend federal laws in 
court. Accordingly, contrary to the assumption of many scholars, Congress lacks 
standing to represent the United States in place of the executive. The Supreme 
Court has entirely overlooked these questions of institutional power in considering 
issues of executive or legislative standing, including, most recently, in the litigation 
over the Defense of Marriage Act. Article III cannot confer power on the executive 
or the legislature that Article II or Article I denies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Standing doctrine is often described as a “bedrock” requirement of Arti-
cle III.1 Accordingly, jurists and scholars have repeatedly asserted (or 
assumed) that the standing of Congress and the executive branch, like other 
actors before the court, depends only on Article III.2 For example, in United 
States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court held that the executive had “Article 
III standing” to appeal a lower court decision invalidating the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), even though the executive declined to defend 
DOMA and, in fact, had sought the lower court ruling striking down the 
law.3 Although the dissenting opinions sharply disagreed with that conclu-
sion, no Justice doubted that the jurisdictional issue was governed entirely 
by Article III.4 Likewise, while the Court did not formally rule on the House 
 
1 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003) (“One element of the ‘bedrock’ case-or-
controversy requirement is . . . standing to sue.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982)))). See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (holding that the executive 
branch had Article III standing to appeal a lower court decision invalidating the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA)); Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the Senate lacked Article III standing to defend a statute that added the words 
“under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: 
Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG, and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 165-
66 (2013) (contending that the House of Representatives in Windsor lacked “Article III standing” 
to defend DOMA); Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 853, 909 (1989) (“Where Congress has authorized the Executive to sue, the Executive has 
an interest that satisfies article III . . . .”); Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in 
Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1578-79 (2012) (arguing that the House of 
Representatives in Windsor must “establish Article III standing”); Calvin Massey, State Standing 
After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 261 (2009) (arguing that when the executive 
enforces federal law, it satisfies Article III standing requirements); Thomas W. Merrill, Global 
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 300 (2005) (“[T]he ‘cases’ and 
‘controversies’ that make up the judicial power conferred by Article III include . . . public 
actions brought by public authorities . . . .”). 
3 133 S. Ct. at 2683-84, 2686.  
4 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice 
Thomas, contended that the case lacked the requisite Article III “adverseness” because the plaintiff 
and the executive branch agreed that DOMA was invalid. See id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain but an 
opposing party . . . .”); see also id. at 2711-12 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court would 
“render an advisory opinion, in violation of Article III’s dictates,” if it heard the appeal at the 
executive’s request). 
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of Representatives’ standing to appeal in Windsor, the Justices assumed that 
the House’s standing would depend only on an analysis of Article III.5 
I argue, however, that the standing of the executive branch and the leg-
islature cannot be determined solely by Article III. This assertion rests on a 
basic constitutional principle: federal institutions must have affirmative 
authority for their actions. That is no less true with respect to the power to 
file suit or appeal in federal court. Article III defines the federal “judicial 
Power” and does not purport to confer any power on the executive or the 
legislature.6 Executive and legislative standing must instead stem from the 
provisions conferring power on those institutions—principally, Article II 
and Article I. 
This insight has important implications. First, Article II helps both to 
explain the breadth and to define the limits of executive standing. In sharp 
contrast to private parties,7 the executive may bring suit to enforce or 
defend federal law, absent a showing of concrete injury.8 The executive’s 
 
5 The Court directed the parties to address whether the House had “Article III standing,” 133 
S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012), granting cert. to 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), but ultimately declined to 
decide the issue, since it found that the executive had standing. 133 S. Ct. at 2686-88. In their 
dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia and Alito nevertheless debated the House’s Article III standing 
to appeal. Compare id. at 2711-14 & n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that the House had 
“Article III standing” because the lower court decision striking down the law “impair[ed] 
Congress’ legislative power” and thereby “injur[ed]” the House), with id. at 2703-04 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the “impairment of a branch’s powers alone” does not “confer[] 
standing”). See also infra Section III.A. 
6 Article III does recognize Congress’s authority to create inferior courts and to regulate the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. But Congress’s affirmative power 
comes from Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, 18 (empowering Congress “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court” and to make laws that are “necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” the federal government’s powers); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of 
Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 80 (most of “Congress’ power 
regarding the judiciary derives” from the Necessary and Proper Clause). The only exception may 
be the Exceptions Clause of Article III, which seems to give Congress a greater power over the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction than might be conferred by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause alone. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 929, 938-40 & n.39, 981 & n.279 (2013); see also Engdahl, supra, at 155 (the Exceptions 
Clause “enlarge[s] Congress’ discretion”). 
7 A private party must demonstrate a concrete injury that was caused by the defendant and 
that can be redressed by the requested relief. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). 
A private party cannot sue simply to enforce federal law. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 
(1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).  
8 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Con-
nections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 667 (2006) (“In suits by the government, courts 
characteristically make no inquiry into injury.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General 
and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 627 (2005) (“Federal courts regularly adjudicate 
government enforcement actions that would lack ‘injury in fact’ if brought by private plaintiffs.”); 
infra Section I.B (discussing cases recognizing executive standing to enforce federal law). 
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broad standing arises out of its duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”9 The Take Care Clause generally requires the executive to 
protect the federal government’s interests in the enforcement and continued 
enforceability of its laws—in part by bringing suit and defending federal 
laws in court. To accommodate the executive’s Article II duties, the federal 
courts treat such executive actions as Article III “cases” and “controversies.” 
Executive standing thus depends on a contextual reading of Article II and 
Article III. 
But I argue that the Take Care Clause does not confer on the executive 
branch unlimited power to invoke federal jurisdiction. The executive has 
standing only when it asserts the federal government’s interests in the 
enforcement and continued enforceability of federal law. Accordingly, when 
the executive no longer seeks to protect that law-enforcement interest—
when (as in Windsor) the executive refuses to defend a federal law—it no 
longer has an Article II power to invoke federal jurisdiction.10 In such 
nondefense cases, the executive seeks further review simply to obtain a 
higher court resolution of a constitutional question. Although the executive 
may have strong political and institutional reasons to seek such a judicial 
decision, no provision of Article II (or any other part of the Constitution) 
gives the executive branch standing to obtain a judicial settlement of a 
constitutional question.11 Absent such affirmative power, the executive lacks 
standing. 
Likewise, the power of the federal legislature to bring suit cannot be 
determined by reference to Article III alone but depends on the constitu-
tional provisions conferring power on Congress—primarily, those found in 
Article I. Building on prior work,12 I argue that the Constitution does not 
give Congress the power to assert in court the federal government’s inter-
 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
10 This argument connects the standing inquiry to the ongoing debate over the executive’s 
“duty to defend” federal laws that the President views as invalid. Compare, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1235 (2012) (arguing that “the executive 
branch should enforce and defend statutes . . . even when it views them as wrongheaded [and] 
discriminatory”), with Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012) (arguing that the President should neither enforce nor defend 
laws that he views as unconstitutional). 
11 As explained below, I do not believe that executive standing in nondefense cases can be 
justified on the ground that the executive is faithfully executing the Constitution. See infra notes 
66, 178-83 and accompanying text.  
12 See generally Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself 
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014).  
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ests in the enforcement or defense of federal law. Absent such affirmative 
power, Congress also lacks standing. Article III cannot confer on the 
executive or the legislature a power that Article II or Article I denies. 
My arguments as to the scope and limits of executive and legislative 
standing rest primarily on the constitutional text and structure as well as 
Supreme Court precedent.13 However, I also believe that the restrictions on 
executive and legislative standing have strong normative underpinnings. As 
political scientists have demonstrated, both the executive branch and 
Congress have considerable incentives to refer controversial constitutional 
questions to the judiciary.14 Constraining the standing of the political 
branches helps protect the courts from becoming substitute fora for matters 
that could have been, but were not, resolved through the political process. 
At the same time, these standing restrictions help protect individual liberty. 
Neither the executive nor the legislature should be permitted to subject an 
individual to suit or to further rounds of appeals simply because it may be 
politically convenient to obtain a judicial resolution of a legal question. 
These non–Article III principles have significant implications for legal 
scholarship and federal litigation. First, this analysis undermines the 
assumption of jurists, scholars, and the executive branch itself that the 
executive has complete discretion to enforce a law and then refuse to defend 
it—thereby teeing up the issue for Supreme Court review.15 I demonstrate 
that the executive lacks standing to seek Supreme Court (or other appellate) 
review when it declines to defend a law. This analysis also shows that, 
 
13 Accordingly, throughout this Article, I employ a form of structural inference. For a discus-
sion of the widely accepted practice of making inferences from constitutional structure, see 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-32 
(1969). See also John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 2034-39 (2011) (describing structural inference as an important tool of constitutional 
analysis and interpretation). 
14 See infra Sections II.C, III.B (outlining circumstances where other branches refer matters 
to the judiciary). 
15 See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 201 (1994) (“[T]he President may base his decision to comply (or decline to comply) [with a 
statute] in part on a desire to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity to review the constitu-
tional judgment of the legislative branch.”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of 
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 47, 
51 (arguing that the President should enforce a law, if that is the only way to “create[] the 
opportunity for” Supreme Court review); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1073, 1078 n.14 (2001) (“[T]he practice of ‘enforce but decline to defend’ . . . allows the 
Executive Branch to make its views known to the Court, and ordinarily places before the Court 
the opportunity to resolve the constitutional dispute between the other two branches.”); infra 
Section IV.A. 
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contrary to the assumption of many scholars,16 Congress lacks standing to 
represent the United States in place of the executive, even in defense of 
federal law. 
At the outset, however, I should clarify a few points. First, throughout 
this Article, “standing” refers to a litigant’s power to bring suit or appeal in 
federal court. Although I recognize that standing doctrine has often “give[n] 
lawyers, scholars and courts considerable difficulty,”17 that seems to be the 
most basic meaning of the term.18 Thus, executive and legislative standing 
refers to the power of those institutions to invoke federal jurisdiction at trial 
or on appeal—typically, on behalf of the United States. Notably, the 
Supreme Court has frequently invoked the concept of standing in this 
way—to signify the power of individuals or institutions to bring suit on 
behalf of the state or federal government.19 Accordingly, the questions of 
 
16 See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal–Agent Problem, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1248 (2012) (arguing that congressional defense does not “raise[] the 
thorny problem of legislator standing” because “when Congress defends a statute in the Executive’s 
stead, it is not acting for itself but instead for the United States”); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive 
Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-but-Not-Defend Problem, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582, 595-97 (2012) (arguing that “Congress could pass a statute 
authorizing the Senate or House Counsel, or counsel representing both houses jointly, to 
litigate . . . on behalf of the United States” to seek a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality 
of a law that the executive declined to enforce). Other scholars assert that Congress may defend 
federal laws but do not clearly state whether they believe Congress has standing to do so on behalf 
of the United States. See, e.g., William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 874 n.260 (2001) (arguing that Congress “has the right 
to defend [a] statute” when the executive fails to defend it); see also Amanda Frost, Congress in 
Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 919, 952, 957 n.218, 964-65 & n.239 (2012) (“propos[ing] that 
Congress take a more active role in federal litigation,” including in defense of laws). 
17 Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the “Political Question Doctrine,” and Foreign Relations, 17 
UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1138 n.11 (1970) (noting that the term “standing” has often “give[n] lawyers, 
scholars and courts considerable difficulty” because it has been used “to refer to several quite 
distinct limitations upon the power and the willingness of federal courts to entertain” cases); see 
also infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (outlining some of the debates about the nature of 
standing). 
18 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 245 (1990) (“Standing 
focuses on the litigant’s ability to initiate a suit . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664, 2666-68 (2013) (noting that a state 
attorney general or a state legislator “authorized by state law to represent the State’s interest may 
satisfy standing requirements,” although holding that the private parties in that case lacked 
standing to represent the State); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000) (holding that a private qui tam relator had “representational standing” to 
bring suit on behalf of the United States to enforce the False Claims Act); Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“[S]tate legislators have standing to contest a decision 
holding a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s 
interests.”). 
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institutional power that I focus on are, in my view, properly described as 
questions of standing.20 
Second, and relatedly, I focus only on executive and legislative stand-
ing—that is, whether those institutions have the constitutional authority to 
take a case to an Article III court. Thus, for example, I argue that the 
executive lacks standing to appeal unless it defends a federal law. But I do 
not claim that the executive has a duty to defend federal laws when another 
party invokes federal jurisdiction (at trial or on appeal), nor do I attempt to 
determine whether the executive has a duty to enforce some (or all) federal 
laws. Those are important Article II questions, but they are not questions of 
standing. 
Finally, I do not mean to suggest that the standing of federal institu-
tions has nothing to do with Article III. I assume for purposes of this 
analysis that standing is a constitutional requirement that is rooted at least 
in part in the “case” or “controversy” requirement of Article III.21 I seek, 
however, to show that Article III alone can neither explain nor justify 
executive or legislative standing. The determination of whether the execu-
tive or legislature may take a given “case” or “controversy” to the courts 
depends in large part on the constitutional provisions conferring power on 
those institutions.22 
 
20 Some readers may view the “institutional power” question differently. At a conceptual 
level, one might say that the primary standing issue is the “standing” of the United States. The 
argument might be that a government is “injured” when its laws are violated or struck down by a 
lower court. But a government cannot bring suit on its own behalf and must rely on others to 
assert its interests in court. Some readers may conclude that the next question—Who may 
represent the government in court?—is not strictly one of standing, but rather a (possibly distinct) 
question of which persons or institutions may serve as the government’s representatives in court. 
The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly characterized this question as one of standing. See 
supra note 19; see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664, 2668 (concluding that private sponsors of a 
state initiative had “no standing to assert the State’s interests” because they suffered no concrete 
injury). I adhere to that terminology here and bracket the question whether the Court is correct in 
analyzing this issue under the rubric of standing. 
21 See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 82 U.S.L.W. 4195, 4197 
(U.S. 2014) (standing doctrine is derived “[f ]rom Article III’s limitation of the judicial power to 
resolving ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ and the separation-of-powers principles underlying that 
limitation”). Many scholars, of course, contest this assumption. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s 
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 235 (1992) 
(“Congress can create standing as it chooses and, in general, can deny standing when it likes.”). 
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently concluded that standing is a constitutional 
requirement. I start from that premise and seek to show that executive and legislative standing 
cannot be determined exclusively by Article III. 
22 One may, of course, question whether the power of any litigant to bring suit or appeal 
should be an issue of the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, 
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (“[S]tanding should simply be a question on 
the merits of plaintiff ’s claim.”). For present purposes, I assume that standing, including executive 
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The argument proceeds as follows. Parts I and II explain how Article II 
informs the scope of executive standing. The executive’s power to bring suit 
or appeal is tied to its Article II duty to enforce and defend federal law on 
behalf of the federal government—a reality that calls into question the 
executive’s standing in contexts when it declines to defend a law. Part III 
argues that the structural Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating 
to itself the power to represent the United States in court. Finally, Part IV 
asserts that there would likely be few, if any, negative ramifications if the 
judiciary enforced these limitations on executive and legislative standing. 
The executive would face considerable political pressure to defend federal 
laws on behalf of the United States, so the government would rarely (if 
ever) be left without a representative in court. At the same time, judicial 
enforcement of these restrictions would limit the power of Congress or the 
executive to refer to the judiciary constitutional questions “that they cannot 
or would rather not address” themselves.23 
I. EXECUTIVE STANDING UNDER ARTICLE II 
Although the Supreme Court mentioned Article II in two important 
standing decisions,24 the Court has subsequently insisted that standing 
doctrine is a bedrock requirement only of Article III. Writing for the Court 
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, Justice Scalia denied that 
standing doctrine is based on a concern about the “Executive’s power to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”25 Justice Scalia declared: 
 
and legislative standing, is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that is rooted at least in part in 
the Article III “case” or “controversy” requirement. My goal here is to show that, even if one 
assumes these points, executive and legislative standing cannot be determined solely by Article III. 
23 Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993); see also id. (arguing that “elected officials consciously invite 
the judiciary to resolve” controversial issues); infra Sections II.C, III.B. 
24 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (declaring that a congressional 
power to grant standing to any private party to enforce federal law would “permit Congress to 
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional 
duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 
(1984) (explaining that separation of powers and equitable principles “counsel[] against recogniz-
ing standing” in a suit requesting broad injunctive relief against a federal agency because “[t]he 
Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”). 
25 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (quoting id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
In Steel Co., the Court held that an environmental group lacked standing to seek penalties for past 
violations of a federal statute because the money would be paid to the U.S. Treasury, not to the 
plaintiff, and thus would not redress any injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 106-07. 
  
1320 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1311 
 
“The courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of 
action, whether or not exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two 
branches. . . . [S]tanding jurisprudence, . . . though it may sometimes 
have an impact on Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not 
Article II.”26  
Windsor further underscores the Court’s focus on Article III. During the 
oral argument, several Justices raised questions about the executive’s Article 
II power to enforce a law that the President views as unconstitutional (like 
the Defense of Marriage Act) and then refuse to defend it in court.27 For 
example, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the President should have the 
“courage of his convictions” and simply refuse to execute the law, “rather 
than saying, oh, we’ll wait till the Supreme Court tells us we have no 
choice.”28 Likewise, Justice Kennedy found it “very troubling” that the 
President was enforcing a law that he viewed as unconstitutional but 
refusing to defend it in court.29 These Article II concerns were, however, 
absent from the Windsor opinions. In the opinion for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy found that the executive branch had Article III standing to appeal, 
despite its decision not to defend DOMA.30 Likewise, in discussing the 
executive’s power to appeal, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion made no men-
tion of Article II.31 Apparently, in the Supreme Court’s view, even the 
executive branch’s own standing “derives from Article III and not Article II.”32 
The Justices’ view of executive standing accords with the scholarly con-
sensus. Scholars have not examined executive standing in depth. But to the 
extent that commentators have considered the issue, they have assumed—
virtually without exception—that executive standing is governed only by 
 
26 Id. at 102 n.4. 
27 The Attorney General announced this enforce-but-not-defend approach in a letter to 
Congress. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to John A. Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter] (stating that the 
executive adopted this approach after the President concluded that DOMA violated equal 
protection principles); infra Section II.B. 
28 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 
12-307) (statement of Chief Justice Roberts). 
29 Id. at 21-22 (statement of Justice Kennedy) (comparing the practice of enforcing but not 
defending a law to the “questionable” practice of a President signing a law but issuing a signing 
statement declaring that the law is unconstitutional). 
30 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.  
31 See supra note 4 (noting that Justice Scalia focused on the lack of Article III “adverse-
ness”); infra subsection II.B.1. Justice Scalia referenced the Take Care Clause only in arguing that 
the House of Representatives lacked standing in Windsor. See 133 S. Ct. at 2703 (doubting that 
Congress could “hale the Executive before the courts” to ensure the faithful execution of the laws). 
32 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998). 
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Article III.33 I argue, however, that executive standing depends in large part 
on the powers and duties in Article II. 
A. The Article II Foundations of Executive Standing 
My argument rests on a basic principle of federal constitutional law: 
federal institutions—in sharp contrast to private parties, states, or locali-
ties—must have affirmative authority for their actions, including the power 
to bring suit in federal court.34 Article III defines the federal “judicial 
Power” and specifies that this power extends to “cases” arising under federal 
law and “controversies” involving the United States.35 But Article III does 
not purport to confer any authority on the executive to bring suit or 
appeal—either on behalf of the United States or otherwise.36 Affirmative 
authority for executive standing must be found in Article II. 
No provision of Article II expressly authorizes the executive branch to 
bring suit or appeal. Much of Article II is concerned with administrative, 
foreign policy, or military matters, such as the Appointment and Treaty 
Clauses.37 The Vesting Clause of Article II, which vests the “executive 
 
33 See supra note 2 (listing sources). There are two exceptions. In prior work, Edward Hart-
nett and I separately asserted that executive standing to bring criminal or civil enforcement 
actions depends on Article II. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 794-95 (2009); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the 
United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the 
Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2256 (1999). But both Professor Hartnett’s essay and my 
own prior work focused on the restrictions on private-party standing to enforce federal law. This 
Article, by contrast, focuses on the scope and limits of executive standing. 
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) 
(stating that “no one disputes the proposition that ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Govern-
ment of limited powers,’” and noting that the Tenth Amendment makes this principle “explicit” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))).  
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . [and] to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party . . . .”); see also William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement 
in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 266 (1990) (stating that the 
term “controversies” was to be limited to civil actions, while the term “cases” encompassed both 
civil and criminal suits). 
36 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
37 See id. art. II, § 2 (conferring on the President the power to appoint executive and judicial 
officers, make treaties, issue pardons, seek opinions in writing from department heads, and serve 
as the “Commander in Chief ”  of the armed forces); id. art. II, § 3 (authorizing the President to 
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). Article II also gives the President a role in 
advising Congress on the “State of the Union” and suggesting legislation. Id. 
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Power” in the President,38 likely confers some power to bring suit, given 
that the authority to enforce or defend federal laws in court is an integral 
part of law execution.39 But any such “executive Power” is qualified by the 
Take Care Clause, which imposes on the President a duty to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”40 Accordingly, I treat the Take Care Clause 
as the primary Article II source of executive standing.41 
As described further below, in order to fulfill this faithful execution duty, 
the executive must often go to court to enforce and defend federal law on 
behalf of the United States. Notably, Article II helps explain the contrast 
between the standing of the executive branch and that of other actors. 
Article III makes clear that the terms “case” and “controversy” include 
criminal and civil disputes involving the United States.42 Moreover, it 
seems clear that, as a sovereign, the United States has a judicially cognizable 
interest in the enforcement and defense of federal law.43 Under current law, 
the executive may assert in court the federal government’s sovereign 
interests without satisfying the injury, causation, or redressability require-
ments that the judiciary applies to other actors.44 Article III alone cannot 
 
38 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
39 See Sections I.B–C (discussing the importance to law execution of federal court enforce-
ment and defense actions). 
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added); see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffer-
sonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 33 (similarly observing that the “presidential power 
of law execution granted by the Vesting Clause” is “cabined by the Take Care Clause”). 
41 Scholars have at times asserted that the Take Care Clause is not a grant of power but 
serves only to qualify the “executive Power” conferred by the Vesting Clause. See, e.g., Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhoades, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1198 n.221 (1992) (suggesting that the “use of the verb ‘take care’ in the Take 
Care Clause bolsters the power-grant reading of the Vesting Clause of Article II”). However, to 
the extent that the Take Care Clause requires the President to take action to “faithfully execute” 
the law, the Clause may imply that the President has the power to take such action. Accordingly, 
the Take Care Clause may be both a grant of power and the imposition of a duty. In any event, to 
the extent that the Vesting Clause is the source of executive power to bring suit in court, that 
power is qualified by the Take Care Clause. Accordingly, I focus on the latter Clause throughout 
this Article. 
42 See supra note 35. 
43 See infra Sections I.B–C (discussing how courts have recognized the federal government’s 
interests in the enforcement and continued enforceability of its laws). 
44 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress’s Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 44, 67-68 (1999) (noting that the government need not show injury in fact); see also infra 
Sections I.B–C; supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. The Court has applied the injury, 
causation, and redressability tests to state government plaintiffs that seek to enforce federal law. 
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520, 521-26 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts had 
standing to challenge EPA’s denial of its rulemaking petition because EPA’s conduct presented a 
“risk of harm” and there was a “‘substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested’ w[ould] 
prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk” (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Grp., Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978))). A state, however, has broad standing to assert its sovereign 
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explain why such an executive-initiated action qualifies as an Article III 
“case” or “controversy” while analogous private-party actions do not; after 
all, a private party might also want to enforce or defend federal law on 
behalf of the United States.45 But this dichotomy makes more sense once we 
take into account the fact that Article II requires the executive to assert in 
court the abstract, generalized interest in enforcing federal law.46 To 
accommodate the executive’s Article II responsibilities, the federal judiciary 
treats executive enforcement and defense actions as “cases” and “controver-
sies” under Article III.47 
In this way, executive standing depends on the intersection of Article II 
and Article III. The Take Care Clause of Article II imposes constitutional 
duties on the executive that it cannot perform without resort to Article III 
 
interest in the continued enforceability of state law, when that law is challenged in federal court. 
See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
45 If a private party sought to invoke federal jurisdiction, asserting nothing more than the 
United States’ sovereign interest in the enforcement of its laws, the judiciary would hold that the 
private party lacks standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (“[A] 
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his 
and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state 
an Article III case or controversy.”). The Supreme Court has permitted private parties to sue on 
behalf of the federal government only to vindicate common law proprietary interests. See Vt. 
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 773-74 (2000) (uphold-
ing the standing of a private qui tam relator to enforce the False Claims Act and thereby vindicate 
the government’s “proprietary injury resulting from . . . alleged fraud”). Although the distinc-
tion between “sovereign” and “proprietary” interests may not be satisfactory, I think it is difficult 
to read Stevens as a license for Congress to grant private parties standing to represent the United 
States’ sovereign interests in court. For a different perspective, see Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of 
Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 105-08 & n.203 (2007) (interpreting Stevens to suggest that the 
“qui tam tradition” “allows Congress to confer standing upon plaintiffs suffering no distinctive 
injury” for Article III purposes). 
46 Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998) (holding that private plaintiffs lack standing to 
assert “abstract,” “generalized grievance[s]”—like the “interest in seeing that the law is obeyed” 
(alteration in original)). For present purposes, I assume, without defending, the validity of these 
constraints on actors other than the executive branch. In prior work, I have defended the 
constraints on private-party standing to enforce federal law on Article II nondelegation grounds. 
See generally Grove, supra note 33 (arguing that standing limits private prosecutorial discretion). 
For other recent defenses of the limits on private-party standing, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECI-
SION MAKING 159 (2000) (asserting that standing helps prevent litigants “from strategically 
timing cases . . . to manipulate the substantive evolution of constitutional doctrine”), and 
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (contending 
that standing helps “prevent the inefficient disposition of constitutional entitlements”). 
47 Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (“[T]he separation-of-powers doctrine re-
quires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.” (quoting 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))).  
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courts. These Article II duties, in turn, inform the way in which federal 
courts construe the “case” or “controversy” language of Article III. 
B. Standing to Enforce Federal Law 
In order to punish and deter violations of federal law, the executive 
must have the power to bring suit against alleged violators.48 The executive 
generally cannot, consistent with the requirements of due process, simply 
impose criminal or civil penalties; there must be an opportunity for judicial 
review (at least after the fact).49 As a result, the executive must often rely 
on the courts “for the enforcement of coercive sanctions.”50 In short, to 
carry out its duty to faithfully execute the laws, the executive needs to have 
standing to bring criminal and civil enforcement actions. 
It is therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized the executive branch’s standing to enforce federal law. Indeed, 
the Court has never denied executive standing when it had statutory 
authorization.51 For example, in United States v. Raines, the executive 
brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1957,52 alleging that certain local 
election officials discriminated on the basis of race in registering voters.53 
 
48 See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 863 (1982) (observing that a crimi-
nal prosecution is “one example of the Executive’s effort to discharge [its] responsibility” to 
faithfully execute the laws); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate 
remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the 
Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”); Jack 
Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2303-04 
(2006) (“[T]he Take Care Clause contemplates a presidential responsibility to carry out the 
legislative mandate.”). 
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 521, 538-39 (2005) (“Under our system of separated powers, the executive cannot unilaterally 
enforce the law’s penalties[, but must] seek the judiciary’s sanction . . . .”); see also Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 339 (1976) (“The ‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer 
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’” (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
50 Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965). 
51 See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 129-30, 133-34 (1995) (holding that an agency official 
lacked standing, absent statutory authorization, but stating that “Congress could have conferred 
standing . . . without infringing Article III of the Constitution”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael 
G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 473 (1995) (“The problems with governmental 
standing in the nineteenth century arose primarily because the legislature of the sovereign in 
whose courts a government litigant sued had not authorized suit. Once such statutory authority 
was provided, the legitimacy problem disappeared.”). 
52 Civil Rights Act of 1957, pt. IV, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634, 637-38 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)). 
53 362 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1960). 
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Although the local officials argued that Congress lacked the power “to 
authorize the United States to bring this action in support of private 
constitutional rights,”54 the Supreme Court upheld executive standing, 
stating that it was “perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the 
United States to be the guardian of that public interest.”55 
The Supreme Court has also occasionally upheld executive standing to 
enforce federal law when it lacked explicit statutory authorization. For 
example, in In re Debs, the Court concluded that the executive had standing 
to enjoin the Pullman railroad strike, which allegedly violated various 
federal statutes.56 The Court declared that the federal government’s “obliga-
tion[] . . . to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of 
one . . . , is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court.”57 
Since Debs, jurists and scholars have debated the scope of the executive’s 
power to enforce federal law, absent statutory authority.58 I do not seek to 
enter that debate; as a practical matter, the executive has broad statutory 
standing to bring enforcement actions.59 My focus is instead on a subject 
that scholars have not carefully examined—the nature and scope of the 
executive’s constitutional standing to enforce federal law. 
 
54 Id. at 27. 
55 Id.; see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1965) (upholding executive 
standing to protect voting rights, given “express congressional authorization”). 
56 See 158 U.S. 564, 570, 599-600 (1895) (upholding executive standing to prevent interfer-
ence with the transport of U.S. mail), overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 
(1968). For an account of the events leading up to Debs, see OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED 
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 53-74 (1993). 
57 In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 584. 
58 Compare, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The 
United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111, 114-16 (1997) (arguing that the executive 
branch has implied power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment), with Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (contending that the executive 
has only a limited power to “protect and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of 
the United States from harm”), with Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2014) (arguing that courts should imply a cause of action “when a public litigant sues to 
protect typically public interests” but not when it sues to protect private interests); see also United 
States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “the United States 
may not sue [a local police department] to enjoin violations of individuals’ fourteenth amendment 
rights without specific statutory authority”). 
59 Indeed, Congress has at times stepped in to augment the executive’s statutory authority 
when courts held that it lacked standing. See, e.g., Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 
§ 3, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, 350 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a 
(2006)) (conferring standing to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners); see also City of 
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 201-02 & n.22 (discussing this legislation and the history of its enactment). 
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First, I want to underscore an important limit on executive standing. 
The executive has broad standing only to assert the federal government’s 
sovereign interest in the enforcement of its laws. Accordingly, in Debs and 
Raines (and similar cases), the Court discussed the standing of the “govern-
ment” or the “United States,” not the executive.60 The Supreme Court has 
never held that the executive has standing to assert an institutional interest 
in the enforcement of federal law or, relatedly, in protecting any other 
duties or powers conferred by Article II. In fact, the Court has suggested 
precisely the opposite: the executive lacks standing to protect its institu-
tional concerns.61  
The Supreme Court recognized this limitation on executive standing 
(albeit only in dicta) in Raines v. Byrd, when it held that six legislators 
lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act based on an alleged 
“institutional injury.”62 The Court emphasized that in past “confrontations 
between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch” 
involving the President’s removal power, the pocket veto, and the legisla-
tive veto, “no suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official 
authority or power.”63 Instead, the issues were brought to the judiciary by 
“plaintiff [s] with traditional Article III standing.”64 This “historical prac-
tice” tends to cut against any claim of “institutional injury” by the executive 
or the legislature (at least one arising out of the enactment of a federal 
law).65 Raines thus supports my assertion that the executive has standing to 
 
60 Raines, 362 U.S. at 27 (holding that Congress may “authorize the United States” to enforce 
civil rights laws); In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 583 (stating that “the government has such an inter-
est . . . as enables it to appear as party plaintiff ” ); see also Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) (“[The United States] has a standing in this suit not only to 
remove obstruction to interstate and foreign commerce, . . . but also to carry out treaty 
obligations . . . .”).  
61 See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 130 (1995) (doubting that the “mere existence and 
impairment of [an executive official’s] governmental interest” could alone “ever suffice” for 
standing purposes). 
62 See 521 U.S. 811, 814, 817, 821, 829-30 (1997). The legislators alleged that the President’s 
power to veto specific parts of legislation would “dilute[] their Article I voting power.” Id. at 817 
(citation omitted). 
63 Id. at 826-28.  
64 Id. at 827. 
65 See id. at 826 (stating that “historical practice . . . cut against” a finding of standing). As 
discussed below, I do not mean to foreclose the possibility that federal institutions may have 
standing to assert some “institutional interests.” See infra note 209 and accompanying text 
(explaining how the House and the Senate likely have standing to enforce their internal rules by, 
for example, bringing subpoena enforcement actions against individuals who refuse to testify in 
Congress). Here, I seek only to show that precedent strongly suggests that when the executive 
brings suit to enforce or defend federal law, it does so on behalf of the United States. For an 
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assert the interests of the federal government, not the executive. The 
interests of the executive may not be coextensive with those of the United 
States. 
This limitation underscores the way in which executive standing de-
pends on the intersection of Article II and Article III. The executive has 
standing to perform Article II duties that it cannot perform except through 
the Article III courts. The executive often cannot enforce federal law except 
through the courts; due process principles require judicial review when 
individuals object to the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions. Nor, as 
discussed below, can the executive protect the continued enforceability of 
federal law absent standing to defend those laws in court.  
By contrast, the executive can protect its institutional interests against 
congressional interference without resort to the courts; the President can, 
for example, veto or refuse to enforce measures (if enacted) that interfere 
with presidential prerogatives. Likewise, as I explain below, the executive 
can “faithfully execute” the Constitution without resort to an Article III 
court—by simply refusing to enforce a law that the President views as 
unconstitutional. The executive does not need judicial permission when it 
declines to enforce a law.66 The executive must go through the judiciary only 
to protect the federal government’s interest in the enforcement of its laws 
against third parties. For that reason, the federal courts treat such executive 
enforcement and defense actions as Article III “cases” or “controversies.” 
Second, and conversely, I also want to underscore the breadth of execu-
tive standing—even when the executive serves only as the representative of 
the federal government. The executive has the constitutional authority to 
enforce any federal law. Accordingly, the executive branch may bring suit 
against any person for any legal violation. That is a tremendous discretion-
ary power—one that creates the potential for discriminatory, or simply 
arbitrary, enforcement.67 As then–Attorney General (and later Supreme 
Court Justice) Robert Jackson stated:  
 
argument that institutions, rather than private parties, should presumptively have standing to 
assert their own institutional interests, see Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 
VA. L. REV. 1435, 1440-41 (2013). 
66 See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. 
67 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686-97 (2004) (arguing that courts should review enforcement decisions to 
“prevent[] arbitrary agency decisionmaking”); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (“The deficiency of prosecutorial 
discretion lies . . . in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, 
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 If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can 
choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecu-
tor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick 
cases that need to be prosecuted . . . . It is here that law enforcement 
becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with 
the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political 
views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor 
himself.68 
I emphasize the concerns raised by scholars in the enforcement context 
for two related reasons. First, as discussed below, the executive exercises 
similarly broad (and largely overlooked) discretion in the defense context—
to intervene in and appeal any case involving a constitutional challenge to a 
federal law. Second, many scholars advocate a “congressional counsel” that 
would have the same broad discretion to intervene in any suit to (at least) 
defend federal law. Although there may be reasons for limiting executive 
discretion to invoke the federal judicial power, I argue in Part III that there 
is little basis for transferring such discretionary power to Congress. 
That seems particularly true, given that the primary check on executive 
discretion is Congress.69 Congress can, for example, limit the executive 
through oversight hearings,70 statutes that set enforcement priorities,71 or 
the appropriations power.72 Furthermore, in egregious cases, Congress can 
impeach and remove executive officials, including the Attorney General or 
the President, for a failure to faithfully execute the law.73 It is not clear who 
would oversee a “congressional counsel” that had the power to represent the 
United States in court. 
 
Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 218-25 (1949) (expressing concerns about “administrative arbitrariness”). 
68 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940). 
69 Executive enforcement decisions are also subject to some internal executive controls. See 
Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling 
Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 960 n.303 (2000) (noting that the Executive Office of U.S. 
Attorneys conducts reviews to ensure that field offices “comply[] with Department policies and 
procedures”). They are also subject to a very limited form of judicial review. See Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that the executive may not prosecute an individual for 
“exercis[ing] . . . protected statutory and constitutional rights”). 
70 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement 
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 791 (1999). 
71 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).  
72 See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 394, 418 (1982). 
73 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3, cl. 6. 
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C. Standing to Defend Federal Law 
The defense of federal statutes is, like enforcement, a central part of the 
faithful execution of the law. To enforce any law in federal court, the 
executive must be prepared to defend that law against constitutional 
challenge. For example, in United States v. Raines, the local officials not only 
contested executive standing but also alleged that the Civil Rights Act of 
1957 was an invalid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.74 To continue the enforcement action, the executive 
had to defeat that constitutional challenge.75 
Other cases commence as suits for a declaratory judgment to avert the 
future enforcement of federal law.76 When a private party initiates the 
lawsuit, the executive need not, of course, demonstrate standing in the trial 
court. But the executive must have standing to appeal.77 For example, in 
Gonzales v. Raich, two women brought suit against the Attorney General to 
“prohibit[] the enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act” in 
cases involving the possession of home-grown marijuana.78 When the Ninth 
Circuit struck down the statute as applied in such cases, the executive had 
standing to seek further review to ensure the continued enforceability of 
that federal law.79 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed executive standing in a 
case where it defended the constitutionality of a law (nondefense cases are 
discussed below), the Court has recognized these principles in the context 
of state law.80 In Maine v. Taylor, the Court held that a state had standing to 
 
74 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960).  
75 The lower court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 exceeded Congress’s enforcement 
power under the Fifteenth Amendment. On appeal by the executive, the Supreme Court reversed. 
See id. at 24-26. 
76 Under the Court’s current standing jurisprudence, the enforcement must be “imminent.” 
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147-48 (2013).  
77 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (stating that the “party 
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” the elements of standing).  
78 545 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2005). 
79 Id. at 7-9 (observing that the executive sought review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision). The 
Court rejected the Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 25-26, 31-33. 
80 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a State has 
a cognizable interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by a judicial 
decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.” (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 
(1986))); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) (“[A] State has standing to defend the 
constitutionality of its statute.”). There may, of course, be differences between federal and state 
standing. For example, state legislatures may have broader standing than the federal legislature. 
Although I argue that Congress may not represent the federal government in court, see infra Part 
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appeal a lower court decision invalidating a state law (even though the state 
had not initiated the lower court action), on the ground that “a State clearly 
has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own stat-
utes.”81 Likewise, the executive branch has standing to assert the federal 
government’s interest in the “continued enforceability” of its laws. 
By statute, the executive even has standing to defend federal laws that it 
does not enforce. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2403, the executive may intervene in 
any federal court action in which a litigant challenges the constitutionality 
of a federal statute.82 Upon intervening, the executive may exercise “all the 
rights of a party,” including the right to present evidence and to appeal, “to 
the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating 
to the question of constitutionality.”83 The executive has relied on § 2403 to 
defend and appeal lower court decisions invalidating, for example, the civil 
enforcement provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as well as 
countless provisions that purport to abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
private suits.84 
Some commentators have suggested that if the executive has standing to 
defend laws that it does not execute, then there must be no necessary 
connection between constitutional defense and law execution. Accordingly, 
other actors, including Congress, may intervene in defense of federal laws—
despite the fact that Congress has no role in law enforcement.85 But that 
 
III, state legislatures may assert their states’ sovereign interests. See Arizonans for Official English 
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“[S]tate legislators have standing to contest a decision holding 
a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s inter-
ests.”). But that is simply a question of which institutions may assert the government’s interest in 
the continued enforceability of its laws. The state and federal governments are quite analogous 
insofar as they seek to vindicate a sovereign interest in defending their laws. 
81 477 U.S. at 137. In Taylor, the federal government criminally prosecuted a defendant for 
violating a federal statute that prohibited, among other things, the importation of fish or wildlife 
“in violation of any law or regulation of any State.” Id. at 132-33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. 
§ 3372(a)(2)(A) (1982)). When a lower federal court held the relevant state law invalid (and thus 
an improper basis for the prosecution), the federal government did not seek further review. Id. at 
133. Only Maine took the case to the Supreme Court. Id. at 136-37. 
82 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2012). 
83 Id. The law requires courts to notify the Attorney General about any constitutional chal-
lenge and to give the “United States” an opportunity to intervene. Id. 
84 See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 155 (2006) (noting that the federal gov-
ernment intervened and appealed “to defend the constitutionality of [the] abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity” in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 604 (2000) (observing that the government intervened and 
appealed “to defend [the] constitutionality” of a provision in the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994 creating “a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence”). 
85 See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (responding to scholarly arguments that 
“enforcement” is separate from “defense”). For example, during the Windsor litigation, the House 
of Representatives pointed to executive standing under § 2403 as support for its own standing to 
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argument overlooks both the Article II basis and the nature of executive 
standing. The executive has standing to protect the federal government’s 
interest in the continued enforceability of its laws. By directing the President 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”86 Article II seems to 
authorize executive standing to protect that government interest, even if the 
executive itself will not be doing the enforcing.87 By contrast, as discussed 
in Part III, Congress has no similar constitutional license to assert the 
government’s interests in court. 
Notably, this intervention power significantly expands the executive’s 
discretion to invoke federal jurisdiction in defense cases. As a matter of 
practice (if not constitutional compulsion) in suits against the government, 
if the executive decides to defend a federal statute, it appeals every lower 
court order striking down that law.88 By contrast, the executive is far more 
selective about the cases in which it intervenes and appeals under § 2403.89 
This broad discretionary power raises many of the concerns that Justice 
Jackson highlighted in the context of enforcement actions.90 The executive 
could intervene in and appeal cases for discriminatory, arbitrary, or purely 
political reasons, subjecting only some litigants to further judicial process. 
Indeed, given the executive branch’s success rate in the courts of appeals 
and the Supreme Court, influential litigants have a strong incentive to 
lobby for federal intervention.91 
Such a discretionary power may be justifiable for the reasons that Justice 
Jackson offered in support of executive enforcement discretion. He suggested 
 
defend federal laws, despite the fact that it has no role in law enforcement. See Brief on Jurisdiction 
for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 15, 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (emphasizing that the executive may 
intervene even when it has “no enforcement role”). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
87 Such a construction of the Take Care Clause seems at least sufficiently permissible that 
Congress could conclude that executive intervention is a “necessary and proper” means of 
protecting the government’s interests. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
88 See The Attorney Gen.’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 5 Op. O.L.C. 
25, 25-26 (1981) (asserting that the executive has a “duty to defend” every statute, unless it 
infringes on executive power or is clearly invalid).  
89 See Drew S. Days, III, No Striped Pants and Morning Coat: The Solicitor General in the State 
and Lower Federal Courts, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1995) (discussing how the Solicitor 
General’s office exercises its discretion to intervene). 
90 See Jackson, supra note 68, at 5. 
91 For a discussion of the government’s litigation advantage, see Herbert M. Kritzer, The 
Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGA-
TION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342, 342-70 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan 
S. Silbey eds., 2003). 
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that we allow executive officials to exercise broad discretion, not because we 
are confident that they will always act appropriately, but because the federal 
government needs a representative in court to prosecute violations of 
federal law.92 Likewise, when Congress enacted the intervention statute in 
1937, it concluded that the government needed a representative in court to 
defend federal laws—at that time, New Deal legislation that was repeatedly 
challenged in private litigation.93 
My goal, however, is not to defend the current scope of executive stand-
ing. Congress should perhaps, by statute, curtail executive discretion to 
invoke federal jurisdiction in both the enforcement and the defense con-
texts.94 I offer this survey to show the constitutional scope of executive 
standing. The executive has standing to perform Article II duties that it 
cannot perform except through the Article III courts. The Take Care 
Clause generally imposes on the executive a duty to enforce and to protect 
the enforcement of federal laws on behalf of the federal government. The 
executive often cannot protect that interest—that is, it cannot ensure that 
federal laws are enforced against third parties—without resort to the 
judiciary. By contrast, as I argue below, the Take Care Clause does not 
authorize executive standing in nondefense cases, when the executive no 
longer asserts that law-enforcement interest, and no provision of the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to represent the United States in 
court. 
II. ARTICLE II AND EXECUTIVE NONDEFENSE 
The executive’s refusal to defend the law in Windsor and other promi-
nent cases has drawn considerable attention to executive standing in 
 
92 Jackson, supra note 68, at 3. 
93 At the time, there were reports of “collusive suits” (often between shareholders and corpo-
rations) brought solely to attack New Deal legislation. See The Judiciary Act of 1937, 51 HARV. L. 
REV. 148, 148-49 & n.3 (1937); Revision of Procedure in Constitutional Litigation: The Act of 1937, 38 
COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1938) (noting the concern about collusive suits and Congress’s view 
that private parties often lacked “the financial means to handle constitutional litigation adequate-
ly”). Soon after the law’s passage, the government sought to intervene in and appeal a lower court 
ruling in a “collusive suit.” See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 302-05 (1943) (holding that 
a landlord and tenant colluded to challenge federal rent controls). 
94 Given the importance of enforcement and defense actions to faithful execution, there may 
be constraints on Congress’s power to limit executive standing. Article II may require some 
“essential role” for the executive branch, as scholars have argued in the context of the judiciary. 
See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). I do not seek to resolve that issue here. 
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nondefense cases.95 But the discussion thus far has occurred in a vacuum—
without much consideration of why the executive typically has standing in 
federal court. In part for that reason, as Windsor illustrates, scholars and 
jurists have treated executive standing as an issue that can be answered 
solely by reference to Article III. But as I demonstrate in this Article, 
executive standing depends in large part on the powers and duties conferred 
by Article II. 
Drawing on this analysis, I argue that the Take Care Clause informs 
both the scope and the limits of executive standing. The executive has 
standing to appeal a decision invalidating a federal law only if it has an 
Article II power and duty to enforce (or protect the enforcement of) that 
law. In that event, the executive has standing—as it typically does—to 
assert the federal government’s interest in the continued enforceability of 
the law against third parties. The executive lacks standing, however, when it 
no longer asserts that law-enforcement interest—that is, when it asks a 
court to strike down a federal law. In the latter scenario, the executive seeks 
only a higher court resolution of a difficult constitutional question. Al-
though the executive may have strong political and institutional reasons to 
seek such a judicial decision, no provision of Article II (or any other part of 
the Constitution) gives the executive branch standing to obtain a judicial 
settlement of a constitutional question. In fact, there are strong normative 
reasons to deny executive standing in this context.  
A. Article II Power as a Preliminary Question 
To have standing to appeal, the executive must possess the Article II 
power to assert the federal government’s interest in the continued enforcea-
bility of the federal law at issue—even if the President deems the law 
unconstitutional. Under certain theories of Article II, the executive lacks 
such power in at least some cases. For example, Raoul Berger argued that 
the President has a duty not to enforce a law that infringes on executive 
 
95 See infra subsection II.B.2 (discussing executive appeals in prominent nondefense cases). 
The executive has likewise refused to defend—and, in fact, has sought the invalidation of—a 
number of other federal statutes in recent decades. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 561 
(reporting that, from December 1975 until May 2011, the executive declined to defend at least 
seventy-five federal statutory provisions). 
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power.96 Other scholars, including Gary Lawson, Neal Devins, and Sai 
Prakash, assert that the executive has a duty not to enforce any law that the 
President considers invalid,97 maintaining that the executive must instead 
“defend and execute [its view of] the Constitution.”98 
The Supreme Court has failed to grapple with this preliminary question 
of institutional power. Windsor offers an illustration. Although Justice 
Kennedy suggested during oral argument that the executive branch lacked 
the Article II power to enforce the Defense of Marriage Act once the 
President concluded that it was unconstitutional,99 his opinion for the Court 
made no mention of Article II. Instead, the Court held that the executive 
had Article III standing to appeal the lower court decision striking down 
DOMA.100 But if the executive lacks the Article II power to enforce a law, 
then it clearly lacks Article III standing to appeal. Under that view, the 
executive branch may not, consistent with Article II, take any action that 
prolongs the enforcement of the law—and thus plainly cannot assert in 
court the federal government’s interest in the continued enforceability of 
the law. Article III cannot confer on the executive a power that Article II 
denies.101 
 
96 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306-
09 (1974) (arguing that the President has “a right and a duty to protect his own constitutional 
functions from congressional impairment”).  
97 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 509 (arguing that the President should not enforce 
or defend laws he deems unconstitutional); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1303 (1996) (asserting that if “the 
President determines that a statute is unconstitutional,” he must refuse to enforce it); see also 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 
GEO. L.J. 217, 221-22 (1994) (arguing that the President “may decline to execute acts of Congress 
on constitutional grounds”). 
98 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1627 (2008); see also John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of 
Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 369-70 (1998) (“The President cannot faithfully execute both 
the Constitution and [what he views as an invalid] statute.”). 
99 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 28, at 21 (statement of Justice Kennedy) 
(asking why the President enforced DOMA, given his determination that the law was unconstitu-
tional). 
100 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686-88 (2013). 
101 None of this is to suggest that the federal government lacks an interest in the continued 
enforceability of the law—only that the executive lacks the affirmative power to assert that 
interest. If Congress disagrees with an executive nonenforcement decision, it has various ways—
such as appropriations, oversight hearings, and political pressure—to contest the executive’s failure 
to enforce or to appeal. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
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B. Standing (Only) to Defend Federal Law 
Other theories of Article II would enable the executive to assert the fed-
eral government’s interest in the continued enforceability of a federal 
statute, even when the President has doubts about the constitutionality of 
the law or firmly believes the law is invalid. In fact, some scholars, includ-
ing Edward Corwin and Eugene Gressman, have asserted that the executive 
branch must enforce virtually every, if not every, federal statute.102 Under 
this view, “once a statute has been duly enacted, whether over [the Presi-
dent’s] protest or with his approval, he must promote its enforcement by all 
the powers constitutionally at his disposal unless and until enforcement is 
prevented by regular judicial process.”103 Other scholars reject this categori-
cal approach but agree that the President must enforce at least some laws 
that he considers invalid.104  
In standing terms, if the executive has an Article II duty to enforce a 
given federal statute, then it has not only the power but also the duty to 
protect the federal government’s sovereign interest in the continued 
enforceability of that federal law. This Article II duty imposes two im-
portant requirements on the executive branch. The executive must not only 
 
102 See BERGER, supra note 96, at 306-09 (arguing that the Take Care Clause requires the 
executive to enforce every law, unless it infringes on executive power); EDWARD S. CORWIN, 
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 71-72 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (arguing that 
the President’s “obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’” requires him to 
enforce every “duly enacted” statute); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF 
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 143-49, 153-54 (1998) 
(urging that the executive must enforce even allegedly unconstitutional statutes “except perhaps 
under extraordinarily limited circumstances”); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986) (“[O]nce a bill has passed through all the constitutional forms of 
enactment . . . the President has no option under article II but to enforce the measure faithful-
ly.”); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 
398 (1987) (“Once Congress enacts a statute . . . the President is duty bound to enforce 
it . . . .”). 
103 CORWIN, supra note 102, at 72. 
104 See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-
Enforcement Power, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 61, 89-91 (arguing for a 
limited nonenforcement power but also asserting that the executive should enforce some laws 
despite the President’s constitutional concerns); Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) 
‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1072-78 (2012) (arguing that the executive should, at 
least presumptively, decline to enforce laws that interfere with executive power but enforce laws 
that infringe on individual rights); Johnsen, supra note 15, at 12-14 (asserting that presidents may 
decline to enforce some laws but should not “disregard laws routinely based solely on their own 
constitutional views”). 
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appeal a decision striking down the law but also defend that law in federal 
court. 
1. Executive Standing and the “Duty to Defend” 
Scholars have often overlooked the fact that the executive’s enforcement 
obligation carries with it a duty to defend.105 But this point follows from the 
fact that the executive has standing to file suit and appeal—not on its own 
behalf but as the representative of the United States. The government’s 
interest is the continued enforceability of its law against third parties; the 
executive need not go through the judiciary to protect any other interest. 
Accordingly, as the representative of the government, the only relief that 
the executive may seek from the judiciary is a decision upholding the 
federal law. 
Notably, contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, this “duty to 
defend” does not come from Article III.106 For example, in Windsor, 
Justice Scalia argued that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction over the 
executive’s appeal, because its agreement with the plaintiff ’s constitutional 
challenge deprived the case of the requisite Article III “adverseness.”107 
Although there may be some sort of adversity requirement in Article III,108 
 
105 See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 102, at 383-84 & n.17 (asserting that although the executive 
must enforce every federal law, “the Executive can refuse to defend” a statute in court); infra 
Section IV.A (discussing scholarship that likewise treats enforcement as separate from defense). I 
have found only one article advocating, on constitutional grounds, a strong “duty to defend.” See 
Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal 
Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 72 (1979) (“Execution means 
enforcement and defense . . . .”). 
106 See Miller & Bowman, supra note 105, at 74-75 (arguing that when the executive branch 
agrees with the private party, there is “a breakdown of the adversary system” and doubting that 
such a suit qualifies as an “article III case or controversy”). 
107 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700-01 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Ar-
ticle III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing 
party . . . . The question here . . . is whether there is any controversy (which requires 
contradiction) between the United States and Ms. Windsor. There is not.”). 
108 For a powerful argument that Article III requires at least some adverseness between the 
parties, see Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 546-48, 
563-88 (2006). The cases discussed here satisfy any such adverseness requirement because the 
executive’s enforcement of the law harms the private party. For example, in INS v. Chadha, the 
executive threatened to deport Jagdish Chadha pursuant to a one-house legislative veto. 462 U.S. 
919, 923-28 (1983). Notably, James Pfander and Daniel Birk have recently offered a strong 
historical argument that Article III does not require “adverse parties” in all cases. See generally 
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and 
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
id=2424511 (contending that the Article III judicial power extends to both “contentious” and “non-
contentious” jurisdiction and that the latter set of cases has no adversity requirement). 
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any such requirement should not extend to the legal arguments that the 
parties make in their briefs and other filings with the court. Otherwise, a 
defendant could defeat a plaintiff ’s case simply by not mounting any defense. 
But as Henry Monaghan has pointed out, it is well established that Article 
III courts have the power to issue default judgments against defendants who 
fail to appear, as well as the power to decide other cases in which the parties 
do not dispute the legal contentions of the other side.109 
Such an “adverse legal argument” requirement would be particularly 
problematic in government litigation. INS v. Chadha110 nicely illustrates this 
point. Chadha involved the pending deportation of an undocumented 
immigrant, Jagdish Chadha.111 The Attorney General had decided to 
suspend Chadha’s deportation and allow him to remain in the country, but 
the House of Representatives (through the one-house legislative veto) 
overruled that decision and directed that he be deported.112 When Chadha 
sought review in the Ninth Circuit, the executive joined him in urging the 
court to strike down the statute authorizing the legislative veto.113 
Appearing as amicus curiae,114 counsel for the House of Representatives 
argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because there was no 
adversity between the parties.115 The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the 
parties were “adverse” in an important sense: the executive branch planned 
to enforce the House’s order and deport Chadha.116 The court rejected the 
claim that the executive’s legal position could prevent Chadha from seeking 
Article III court review of that decision. The court emphasized that if it 
“dismissed the appeal for lack of adversity, we would implicitly approve the 
 
109 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 
1363, 1373-74 (1973) (arguing that the need for “an adversary presentation” of the legal issues 
“hardly seems to be one of constitutional dimension,” as evident from “default judgments, guilty 
pleas, . . . [and] naturalization . . . proceedings”); see also In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 
U.S. 90, 108 (1908) (“Jurisdiction does not depend upon the fact that the defendant denies the 
existence of the claim made, or its amount or validity. If it were otherwise, then . . . the Federal 
court might be without jurisdiction . . . whenever a judgment was entered by default.”). 
Notably, the Windsor Court likewise appeared to conclude that the need for “adverse” legal 
arguments was at most a prudential requirement. See infra note 163.  
110 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
111 Id. at 922-23. 
112 Id. at 925-28. 
113 See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980). 
114 The House and the Senate initially appeared in Chadha as amici curiae. Id. They inter-
vened after the court of appeals invalidated the legislative veto. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930 n.5. 
115 Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419. 
116 Id. 
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untenable result that all agencies could insulate unconstitutional orders and 
procedures from appellate review simply by agreeing that what they did was 
unconstitutional.”117 
The executive’s duty to defend does not stem from Article III but from 
the powers and duties conferred by Article II. If the executive has an 
Article II duty to enforce a law, then it must assert in court the federal 
government’s interest in the continued enforceability of that law. Indeed, 
absent a duty to defend, the executive would in no meaningful sense be 
enforcing (or promoting the enforcement of) that federal law. 
2. No Standing to Seek a Supreme Court Settlement 
The above analysis suggests why the executive lacks standing to appeal 
in nondefense cases. In each of the cases discussed below, the lower court 
(at the executive’s behest) struck down the relevant federal law or otherwise 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the executive asserted that it was 
“aggrieved” because the lower court decision prevented it from enforcing a 
federal law. Accordingly, the executive alleged that it had standing to assert 
the federal government’s interest in the continued enforceability of the law. 
But that is not the interest that the executive sought to protect on appeal. 
The executive did not ask the appellate courts to uphold the law but instead 
urged them to strike it down. It appears that the executive’s primary goal 
was not to protect the government’s interests, but instead to obtain a higher 
court resolution of a contentious constitutional question. 
United States v. Lovett118 involved an appropriations rider that barred the 
executive branch from paying (and thus effectively fired) three named 
federal officials who were believed to have ties to communist organiza-
tions.119 When the employees filed suit in the Court of Claims to challenge 
their termination and recover their unpaid salaries, the Roosevelt Admin-
istration joined them in arguing that the rider was unconstitutional.120 The 
executive asserted that the measure was not only a bill of attainder but also 
an infringement of the President’s Article II removal power because 
Congress had itself terminated three executive officials without impeaching 
 
117 Id. at 420; see also id. (“Where, as here, the agency fully intends to enforce its order, it 
would be a perversion of the judicial process to dismiss the appeal . . . .”). 
118 328 U.S. 303 (1946).  
119 See Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, § 304, Pub. L. No. 78-132, 57 Stat. 431, 450 
(1943) (“No part of any appropriation . . . shall be used, after November 15, 1943, to pay any part 
of the salary . . . of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss 
Lovett . . . .”); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308 (noting the House of Representatives’ concern at that 
time about “subversives” in the government).  
120 Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 143 (Ct. Cl. 1945). 
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them.121 A Special Counsel appointed by the House of Representatives 
appeared as amicus curiae to defend the law.122 The Court of Claims later 
issued a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs but did so without clearly ruling 
on the constitutional issues.123 
The Solicitor General then filed a certiorari petition, asserting that the 
Court should grant review to determine the “liability of the United States” 
to the three employees.124 But the Solicitor General also informed the 
Justices that the executive was “still of the view that the [rider] is unconsti-
tutional” and urged the Court to strike it down.125 Accordingly, the execu-
tive’s goal in seeking Supreme Court review was not to enforce the rider 
and avoid paying the employees (who, in the executive’s view, deserved 
their salaries).126 Instead, as John Hart Ely suggested, the executive likely 
“wanted Supreme Court review” to secure “a judicial halt . . . to legisla-
tive tampering with the removal power.”127 If so, the Supreme Court 
ultimately gave the executive only a partial victory. The Court granted 
review and held the rider unconstitutional but did so on bill of attainder 
grounds without commenting on the removal question.128 
INS v. Chadha129 grew out of a long-running dispute between the execu-
tive and legislative branches over the legislative veto.130 Although Congress 
 
121 See John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11-17 (1975) (discussing the plaintiffs’ and the executive’s “[l]ines of 
[a]ttack”). 
122 Lovett, 66 F. Supp. at 143-44; see also 89 CONG. REC. 10,882 (1943) (authorizing the 
appointment of a Special Counsel). 
123 See Lovett, 66 F. Supp. at 148 (“We do not decide [whether the rider is constitution-
al] . . . . The plaintiffs are entitled to recover in either event.”). 
124 See Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the Court of Claims at 9, Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (No. 
809) (“Although this Department is still of the view that the [rider] is unconstitutional, 
we . . . file this petition for certiorari so that the question as to the liability of the United States 
may be brought to this Court.”), in 44 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 13 (Philip B. Kurland 
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. 
125 Id. 
126 Indeed, the executive initially considered ignoring the rider—and allowing the employees 
to remain at their jobs—but ultimately decided that enforcement was the “most direct way” to 
“force a constitutional adjudication.” Ely, supra note 121, at 4-5. 
127 Id. at 21-22. The Solicitor General’s petition for certiorari supports this account. See Peti-
tion for Writs of Certiorari, supra note 124, at 8-9 (asserting that “‘the opinion of the court’ below 
was in error in holding that [the rider] had not terminated the respondents’ services but had 
merely prohibited the disbursing agencies from paying their salaries,” and generally focusing on 
the removal issue). 
128 Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315-16, 318. 
129 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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began adding such provisions to legislation in the 1930s, the number of 
legislative vetoes skyrocketed in the 1970s.131 Presidents Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan repeatedly objected to the provisions and even threatened to 
disregard some legislative vetoes of administrative action.132 But the 
Presidents found that they could not get many bills through Congress 
without acquiescing in at least some legislative vetoes.133 Therefore, the 
executive opted to fight the veto in the courts.134 
According to political scientist Barbara Craig, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) “viewed Chadha as a promising case for attacking the legislative 
veto.”135 Thus, when the Ninth Circuit struck down the measure as applied 
in deportation cases,136 the executive sought further review in the Supreme 
Court. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives, who had ap-
peared as amici curiae in the Ninth Circuit (and later intervened),137 
challenged the executive’s standing to appeal a lower court decision with 
which it agreed.138 The Solicitor General responded that the executive was 
sufficiently “aggrieved” for purposes of appeal, because the lower court had 
 
130 See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITU-
TIONAL STRUGGLE 36 (1988) (noting that presidents took “exception to legislative vetoes ever 
since their ‘invention’ in the early 1930s”); see also Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It 
Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 273, 281 (“Whatever constitutional 
misgivings presidents may have harbored about the legislative veto, they acquiesced because 
Congress insisted that it would delegate certain authorities only by attaching effective conditions 
of legislative control.”). 
131 CRAIG, supra note 130, at 36 (noting the dramatic increase in the 1970s). 
132 See Legislative Vetoes: Message to the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1146, 1147, 1149 ( June 
21, 1978) (arguing that “legislative veto provisions are unconstitutional” and asserting that the 
Carter Administration would not consider them “legally binding”); Statement on Signing the 
Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, PUB. PAPERS 1207, 1207 (Dec. 29, 1981) (objecting to a 
legislative veto “on constitutional grounds” and stating that the Reagan Administration’s 
Department of Transportation would not regard it as legally binding).  
133 See CRAIG, supra note 130, at 109, 129, 158 (stating that “confrontational tactics” ultimately 
proved “politically unrealistic or administratively unpalatable”). 
134 The Chadha litigation began under President Carter and continued into the Reagan Ad-
ministration. 
135 CRAIG, supra note 130, at 88. 
136 Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1980). 
137 See supra note 114. 
138 See Motion of Appellee U.S. House of Representatives to Dismiss at 1, INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No. 80-1832) (“[T]he INS is one of the prevailing and non-aggrieved parties 
below . . . . The INS therefore has no standing to invoke this Court’s appeal jurisdic-
tion . . . .”); Motion of Appellee U.S. Senate to Dismiss at 1, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (No. 80-
1832) (moving to dismiss the appeal “on the ground that it is brought by a party that prevailed in 
the court of appeals”). 
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“order[ed] the Attorney General to ‘cease and desist from taking any steps 
to deport’” Chadha.139 The Solicitor General further stated: 
Because the constitutional question in this case involves a conflict between 
the Executive and Legislative Branches, it is particularly important that it be 
resolved by the Judicial Branch. Accordingly, the course that the INS chose 
to follow—to enforce the statute, in order to ensure a judicial resolution of 
the controversy . . . was not merely permissible under the circumstances, 
but was a responsible and wholly appropriate response [to the one-house 
veto].140 
As Professor Craig observes, the executive’s goal in Chadha was not to 
protect the continued enforceability of the veto provision. Instead, the 
executive sought a “Supreme Court ‘stamp of approval’” of the Ninth 
Circuit decision invalidating the veto.141 Indeed, “[e]ven more im-
portant . . . was the possibility that the Supreme Court might rule more 
broadly, thus calling many, if not all, of the other legislative veto provisions 
in laws into question.”142 Ultimately the Court obliged, permitting the 
executive’s appeal and issuing a sweeping decision that effectively invalidated 
every legislative veto.143 
Windsor involved a challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act, which 
prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages for 
purposes of federal law.144 President Obama declared his opposition to 
DOMA during the 2008 campaign and, once in office, urged Congress to 
repeal the law.145 But Congress took little action in response to these requests. 
 
139 Reply Brief for the Appellant at 3, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (No. 80-1832), 1981 WL 388501, 
at *3; see also id. (“INS therefore is an ‘aggrieved party’ within the common sense meaning of the 
term: it is subject to an order of the court below prohibiting it from taking action that it otherwise 
would take . . . .”). 
140 Id. at 14; see also id. at 6 (emphasizing that the executive was arguing “against the consti-
tutionality of a statute that . . . infringe[d] upon the prerogatives of the Executive Branch”). 
141 CRAIG, supra note 130, at 167. 
142 Id. 
143 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939-40, 953-54, 959; see also id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting) (“Today 
the Court not only invalidates [the veto provision] of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but 
also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has 
reserved a ‘legislative veto.’”). 
144 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013); see also Defense of Marriage Act, 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (defining “marriage” as “a legal union between one man and one woman”), 
invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
145 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACK-
LASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 126, 142 (2013). 
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Finally, in February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder notified Congress 
that the executive branch would cease defending DOMA but would continue 
to enforce it “unless and until Congress repeals [the law] or the judicial 
branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”146 
“This course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that 
enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the 
constitutional claims raised.”147 
Despite the Attorney General’s assertion, however, the executive did 
not enforce DOMA in every case. For example, the executive opted not to 
apply the law in bankruptcy and some immigration proceedings.148 But the 
executive did enforce the law in Edith Windsor’s case, requiring her to pay 
over $360,000 in federal estate taxes that she would not have had to pay if 
the government had recognized her same-sex marriage.149 Windsor brought 
suit in federal district court to challenge DOMA on equal protection 
grounds, seeking a declaration that DOMA was unconstitutional and a 
refund of the tax.150 The executive branch joined Windsor in arguing that 
the law was unconstitutional and urged the district court to “grant Plain-
tiff ’s motion for summary judgment.”151 
After the lower courts ruled in Windsor’s favor,152 the executive sought 
Supreme Court review. When the Court directed the parties to address the 
issue of executive standing,153 the Solicitor General argued that the executive 
 
146 Holder Letter, supra note 27. 
147 Id. 
148 See KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 161-62 (observing that the executive suspended the 
deportation of some individuals whose same-sex marriages were recognized by state law); Chris 
Geidner, U.S. Trustee Withdraws Appeal of Gay Couple’s Bankruptcy Court DOMA Victory, METRO 
WEEKLY: POLIGLOT ( July 7, 2011), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/07/us-trustee-
withdraws-appeal-of.html (noting that the executive stopped enforcing DOMA in bankruptcy 
cases).  
149 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682-83. 
150 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
151 Defendant United States’ Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff ’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss at 28, Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (No. 
10-8435), 2011 WL 3754396 (arguing that “DOMA fails heightened scrutiny, and this Court 
should . . . grant Plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment”). 
152 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that in-
termediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation and invalidating DOMA 
under that standard); Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (holding that “DOMA’s section 3 does not 
pass constitutional muster,” even under rational basis scrutiny). 
153 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 787 (2012) (directing the parties to address “[w]hether the 
Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction”), granting cert. to 699 F.3d 169. The Court also appointed Professor Vicki 
Jackson to argue, as amicus, that the Court lacked jurisdiction. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 814, 814-15 
(2012) (inviting Professor Jackson to “brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of 
the position[] that the Executive Branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is 
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had standing to assert an injury to the government.154 “The United States 
may properly invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because the judgments of the 
courts below preclude enforcement of a federal statute and require payment 
of federal Treasury funds to plaintiff.”155 
The executive did not, however, seek Supreme Court review to protect 
the continued enforceability of DOMA or to avoid paying Edith Windsor. 
The Solicitor General said as much in his certiorari petitions, declaring that 
“[a]lthough the Executive Branch agrees with the court of appeals’ determi-
nation that Section 3 [of DOMA] is unconstitutional, we respectfully 
seek . . . review so that the question may be authoritatively decided by 
this Court.”156 As in Lovett and Chadha, the executive wanted a “definitive 
judicial ruling that [the law was] unconstitutional.”157 The Supreme Court 
obliged, granting the executive’s petition and holding that DOMA violated 
“basic due process and equal protection principles.”158 
In the above cases, the executive appealed the lower court decisions, not 
to protect the federal government’s interests, but rather to obtain a  
 
unconstitutional deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case, and that the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives lacks Article III standing in 
this case.”); Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 5, Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 315234, at *5 (explaining that the Court “added the two jurisdic-
tional questions, which amica was later invited to brief and argue”). 
154 See Brief for the United States on the Jurisdictional Questions at 6, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683046, at *6 (“The United States may properly invoke this Court’s 
jurisdiction because the judgments of the courts below preclude enforcement of a federal statute 
and require payment of federal Treasury funds to plaintiff. The United States thus satis-
fies . . . the Article III requirement that [an appealing party] be ‘injured,’ by a lower court’s 
decision.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Massa-
chusetts, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (No. 12-15), 2012 WL 2586937, at *12; see also Petition  for a Writ of 
Certiorari Before Judgment at 12, Office of Pers. Mgmt v. Golinski, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (No. 12-
16), 2012 WL 2586938, at *12 (asserting that “the question of [DOMA’s] constitutionality raises 
important questions of federal law that . . . should be[] settled by this Court.”); Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 10, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2012 WL 3991414, 
at *10 (urging the Court to grant certiorari for the reasons stated in the U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. and Golinski petitions). 
157 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 133 S. Ct. 
2887 (No. 12-15), 2012 WL 2586937, at *12 (“[T]he President has instructed Executive departments 
and agencies to . . . enforce [DOMA] until there is a definitive judicial ruling that [it] is 
unconstitutional.”). 
158 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695-96. The Court held that DOMA violated these constitu-
tional principles insofar as it prohibited the federal recognition of marriages that were valid under 
state law. Id. 
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Supreme Court resolution of a constitutional question. But neither the Take 
Care Clause nor any other constitutional provision gives the executive the 
power to ask for the Court’s view on a legal question—a point made clear 
by the Justices’ rejection of President George Washington’s request for a 
legal opinion on his Neutrality Proclamation.159 The executive lacks the 
Article II power—and thus lacks Article III standing—to invoke federal 
jurisdiction simply to request “a definitive verdict”160 on the validity of a 
federal law. 
The Supreme Court has entirely overlooked these Article II principles. 
The Court in Chadha and Windsor permitted the executive to seek further 
review because of the federal government’s interest in the continued 
enforceability of its laws. (The Court in Lovett did not even question the 
executive’s authority to appeal.) Thus, the Chadha Court emphasized that 
the executive planned to “comply with the House action ordering deporta-
tion of Chadha” and was “aggrieved” by the lower court decision preventing 
it from enforcing that order.161 Likewise, the Windsor Court held that the 
“United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on 
appeal,” because the lower court judgment “orders the United States to pay 
money that it would not disburse but for the court’s order.”162 The Court 
 
159 See Letter from John Jay et al., Justices of the Supreme Court, to George Washington, 
President of the United States (Aug. 8, 1793) (“The Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitu-
tion . . . afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the 
questions alluded to; especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling 
on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly 
limited to executive Departments.”), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 755, 755 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998). As the 
Justices suggested, their interpretation is reinforced by the Opinion Clause of Article II, which 
expressly authorizes the President to seek opinions from executive officials. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each 
of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices.”). Akhil Amar has argued that this provision was designed to preclude the President from 
seeking the advice of the judiciary. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 
VA. L. REV. 647, 655-56 (1996) (noting that “in the Opinion Clause, [the President] has no 
explicit right to demand reports from coordinate branches akin to his right to demand reports 
from ‘executive Departments.’”). 
160 Holder Letter, supra note 27. 
161 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930-31 (1983). Like the parties, the Court focused on the 
executive’s appellate jurisdiction under then-applicable statutes. Id. Although the Chadha Court’s 
analysis did not emphasize Article III, as the Windsor Court observed, “the words of Chadha make 
clear its holding that the refusal of the Executive to provide the relief sought suffices to preserve a 
justiciable dispute as required by Article III.” 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (emphasis added). 
162 133 S. Ct. at 2686; see also id. (“[T]he United States retains a stake sufficient to support 
Article III jurisdiction . . . . The judgment in question orders the United States to pay Windsor 
the refund she seeks . . . . The Government of the United States has a valid legal argument that 
it is injured even if the Executive disagrees with . . . DOMA . . . .”). 
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declared: “That the Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund if 
it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it wants does not eliminate 
the injury to the national Treasury if payment is made . . . .”163 
But the executive was not in those cases seeking to redress an injury to 
the government. If it had been, the executive would have had a duty not 
only to appeal but also to seek a Supreme Court ruling upholding the law. 
Instead, in each case, the executive wanted a Supreme Court resolution of a 
constitutional question. The executive, however, has no greater right than 
any other member of society to a Supreme Court stamp of approval. 
C. The Normative Case for Limiting Executive Standing 
My argument for this restriction on executive standing rests primarily 
on the constitutional text and structure, as well as the doctrine recognizing 
executive standing only to represent the United States. But this constitu-
tional restriction also has strong normative underpinnings. First, the denial 
of standing in nondefense cases would help protect the liberty of individuals 
subjected to judicial process by the executive. Second, and more fundamen-
tally, this restriction on executive standing would also protect the federal 
judiciary by limiting the executive’s power to refer controversial constitu-
tional questions to the courts. 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the executive’s approach 
in Lovett, Chadha, and Windsor accords with general executive policies 
concerning the enforcement and defense of federal law—as reflected in 
opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).164 Although the 
executive asserts that it has a duty to enforce and defend most federal laws, 
it also argues that the Take Care Clause does not require it to do so in every 
instance. The executive contends that it may decline to enforce or defend 
any law that, in its view, is clearly invalid or infringes on executive power.165 
Moreover, in determining whether to enforce (or continue enforcing) a law, 
 
163 Id. Although the Court noted that the executive’s failure to defend DOMA “introduce[d] 
a complication,” the only complication was a possible lack of “adverseness” between the parties. Id. 
at 2685, 2687. The Court resolved this issue by declaring adverseness to be a prudential, rather 
than an Article III, requirement. See id. at 2687-88. Any “prudential concerns” were overcome by 
the presence of the House, which had defended DOMA. See id. (noting the House’s “sharp 
adversarial presentation of the issues”). 
164 The OLC provides advice to the executive branch “on all constitutional questions.” About 
the Office, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGAL COUNS., http://www.justice.gov/olc 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
165 See supra note 88. 
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the executive has emphasized the importance of securing judicial—
particularly Supreme Court—review.166 An influential OLC memorandum 
states that “[t]he Supreme Court plays a special role in resolving disputes 
about the constitutionality of enactments.”167 Accordingly, “the President 
may base his decision to comply (or decline to comply)” with a federal 
statute “in part on a desire to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity to 
review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch.”168 
Although the executive’s emphasis on judicial review may be surprising 
(given that it seems to reduce executive power), the executive has strong 
political and institutional incentives to facilitate judicial resolution of 
constitutional questions. As many political scientists have argued, the 
President is well positioned to use the federal judiciary to advance his 
constitutional vision.169 The President not only plays a central role in 
selecting federal judges170 but also “[t]hrough control over the Justice 
Department . . . can exercise significant influence over . . . what argu-
ments are presented” to the courts.171 Moreover, the President may find that 
when he faces a hostile or divided Congress, the judiciary is more receptive 
to his constitutional views.172 Chadha and Windsor illustrate this point. 
Although Presidents Carter and Reagan fought the legislative veto in the 
political arena, they found that they could not defeat the powerful pro-veto 
forces in Congress absent judicial intervention. Likewise, although President 
 
166 The DOJ has declared that the executive will enforce a law, even one that it views as 
unconstitutional, if such enforcement is the only way to secure judicial review. See Presidential 
Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994). 
Conversely, the executive will refuse to enforce a law (such as one infringing on executive power) 
if that is the only way to create a justiciable case. See id.; see also The Attorney General’s Duty to 
Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 57 (1980) 
(asserting that the executive can “best preserve our constitutional system by refusing to honor” a 
limitation on presidential power if that is the only way to ensure judicial review).  
167 18 Op. O.L.C. at 200. 
168 Id. at 201. 
169 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMA-
CY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY 5 (2007) (“Through much of American history, presidents have found it in their 
interest to defer to the Court and encourage it to take an active role in defining the Constitution 
and resolving constitutional controversies.”); infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.  
170 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL 
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 6 (1997) 
(“[T]he placement of the power of judicial selection with the powers of the president [in Article 
II] rather than those of Congress suggests that the executive branch is a principal player in the 
appointment process.”). 
171 WHITTINGTON, supra note 169, at 196. 
172 See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political Fragmentation, and 
the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 102 (2009) (noting that the judiciary can be 
“a vital presidential ally against a recalcitrant Congress”). 
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Obama advocated the legislative repeal of DOMA, he had far more success 
when he took the matter to the courts. 
The political and institutional interests of the executive branch also ex-
plain the emphasis on Supreme Court review. The Solicitor General is in 
charge of virtually all federal litigation in the Supreme Court.173 Thus, as 
former Solicitor General Drew Days put it, “[o]nce cases reach the Supreme 
Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role in the development of 
American law” and can have a substantial “impact upon the establishment of 
constitutional and other principles . . . .”174 This institutional position 
gives the DOJ a strong incentive to seek Supreme Court resolution of 
constitutional questions.175 Likewise, the President has a substantial interest 
in a Supreme Court ruling. Given our strong national culture of judicial 
supremacy, in which political actors and citizens defer to the Court’s 
constitutional views, a Supreme Court settlement of a constitutional 
question not only binds lower courts but also is likely to be seen as authori-
tative by Congress and future Presidents.176 
These political and institutional interests help explain the executive 
branch’s appeals in Lovett, Chadha, and Windsor. The executive in each case 
 
173 See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2012) (charging the Attorney General and Solicitor General with 
litigating suits in the Supreme Court); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93 
(1994) (noting the “Solicitor General’s traditional role in conducting and controlling all Supreme 
Court litigation on behalf of the United States”). 
174 Drew S. Days, III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The Solicitor General’s 
Ethical Dilemma, 22 NOVA L. REV. 677, 680 (1998). 
 In prior work, I argued that this institutional position gives the DOJ a strong incentive to 
oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures, particularly those aimed at the Supreme Court. See Tara 
Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 260-66 
(2012). Here, I emphasize the converse point: the DOJ has a strong incentive to seek Supreme 
Court review of constitutional questions—without regard to any limitations on executive standing. 
176 Notably, I do not seek to defend or endorse judicial supremacy as a normative matter. My 
point is only that, as a descriptive matter, there is in our society widespread deference to the 
Supreme Court on constitutional questions. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009) (arguing that the “American people have 
decided to cede . . . to the justices” the power to make determinations on constitutional 
questions); WHITTINGTON, supra note 169, at 5 (“Through much of American history, presidents 
have found it in their interest to defer to the Court. . . . The strategic calculations of political 
leaders lay the political foundation for judicial supremacy.”); Neal Devins, The Majoritarian 
Rehnquist Court?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 63, 70 (“Today’s Con-
gress . . . rarely casts doubt on . . . the Court’s power to authoritatively interpret the Constitu-
tion.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 
103, 147 (“[T]he modern Congress typically treats the Court as the exclusive authority over 
constitutional issues.”). 
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wanted not only a judicial resolution of the constitutional issue but a 
Supreme Court settlement of the issue. Thus, the Roosevelt Administration in 
Lovett sought (unsuccessfully) a “judicial halt . . . to legislative tampering 
with the removal power”;177 the Carter and Reagan Administrations looked 
to the Court in Chadha to eliminate a political tool that had proven to be a 
thorn in the side of many Presidents; and the Obama Administration asked 
the Court to do what it had failed to do through the legislative process: 
repeal DOMA. In a world of judicial supremacy, a Supreme Court ruling is 
about as good as a repeal. 
But it is important to keep in mind that, under the executive branch’s 
own construction of Article II, it does not need the Supreme Court to “halt” 
the enforcement of federal laws or, relatedly, to settle constitutional ques-
tions. The executive branch believes that it has the power to refuse to 
enforce a law that it views as clearly unconstitutional—as the executive did 
in each of these cases.178 For this reason, even assuming (as seems likely) 
that the Take Care Clause imposes on the executive branch a duty to 
“faithfully execute” not only federal statutes but also the Constitution,179 
the executive can perform this duty without resort to an Article III court. 
As we have seen, in order to enforce federal law against third parties, 
consistent with due process requirements, the executive must often go 
through the courts. But the executive does not need judicial permission 
when it declines to enforce a law on constitutional grounds.180 An executive 
 
177 Ely, supra note 121, at 21. 
178 See supra note 88 and text accompanying note 165. The executive clearly could decline to 
enforce a federal law once a lower court ruled in favor of a private litigant. For example, the 
Roosevelt Administration could have paid the employees in Lovett as soon as the Court of Claims 
ruled in their favor. Moreover, precisely because of the targeted nature of the federal law in that 
case (it applied only to those three employees), such a result would have ensured its uniform 
enforcement. Thus, the Roosevelt Administration did not need Supreme Court review—even 
assuming that the executive lacks power to circumvent an appropriations statute. For a sample of 
the scholarly debate over this issue, compare Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 
1343, 1351 (1988) (“Even where the President believes that Congress has transgressed the 
Constitution . . . the President has no constitutional authority to draw funds from the Treas-
ury . . . .”), with J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1196-
97 (arguing that the President may use “unappropriated spending” to carry out a “textually 
demonstrable duty or prerogative of the President under article II”). 
179 For purposes of this analysis, I assume that the term “Laws” in the Take Care Clause 
includes the U.S. Constitution (as well as treaties and federal common law). See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).  
180 The OLC has acknowledged this point. See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issu-
ance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 31-32, 35-36 (1992) (asserting that 
“[w]here an act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution . . . the President must heed and 
execute the Constitution” and that the President may “treat a statute as invalid prior to a judicial 
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refusal to enforce a law may lead to political repercussions but it does not 
create a due process problem. In short, the executive can “faithfully execute” 
the Constitution—by refusing to enforce an allegedly unconstitutional 
law—without the intervention of an Article III court. 
Thus, for example, the Carter and Reagan Administrations could have 
ignored every legislative veto (as they threatened to do on occasion),181 and 
the Obama Administration could have spared many people the negative 
effects of DOMA by refusing to enforce it in every case, beginning in 
February 2011.182 But such open “confrontation” would have been politically 
costly.183 Accordingly, the executive referred the constitutional question to 
the judiciary—not to protect the federal government’s interest in the 
continued enforceability of federal law, nor because that was the only means 
of enforcing the Constitution or ensuring a uniform settlement of federal 
law—but because it was politically more palatable to have the matter 
resolved by the courts. Article II does not, however, confer on the executive 
the power to invoke federal jurisdiction simply for political convenience. 
Some readers may nevertheless argue that Article II should be construed 
to authorize executive standing in nondefense cases. The argument might 
be that, even if the executive could faithfully execute the Constitution by 
refusing to enforce a law, that should not be the executive’s only option. 
The executive should also be permitted to seek a Supreme Court ruling that 
adopts the executive’s constitutional position that the statute is invalid—as 
the executive sought to do in Lovett, Chadha, and Windsor. Indeed, precisely 
 
determination” because any other approach would suggest that “a statute conflicts with the 
Constitution only when the courts declare so”). 
181 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
182 The executive might have needed appropriated funds to pay health and other benefits to 
the same-sex spouses of federal employees. But as Aziz Huq has observed, given the breadth of 
appropriations statutes, it seems likely that the executive could have found funds to pay those 
individuals. See Huq, supra note 104, at 1026-27 (emphasizing that agencies typically have broad 
discretion in using their lump-sum appropriations). 
183 See CRAIG, supra note 130, at 109, 129 (discussing the political difficulties the Carter Ad-
ministration faced in its opposition to the legislative veto). Such confrontation would be 
politically costly in part because it would distract from other presidential priorities. Moreover, 
many members of Congress may be opposed to the executive making unilateral decisions not to 
enforce federal laws—even when the members agree with the President’s view that a given law is 
unconstitutional. Notably, although Democrats in Congress supported the executive’s decision not 
to defend DOMA, they did not suggest that the President take the further step of refusing to 
enforce the law. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1754 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (“I applaud President Obama and Attorney General Holder for making the right decision 
[in refusing to defend DOMA]. However, the administration is still enforcing DOMA elsewhere, 
because it is the law of the land. It is now time for leaders in Congress to change that law.”). 
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because of our strong national culture of judicial supremacy, such a Su-
preme Court ruling could be an effective way of “executing” the President’s 
preferred interpretation of the Constitution. Under this view, the executive 
may invoke the federal judicial power not only to protect the federal 
government’s interest in the continued enforceability of federal law, but 
also to “faithfully execute” what the executive views as the proper construc-
tion of the Constitution. 
Importantly, the executive branch has not relied on such an argument to 
support standing; the executive, even in nondefense cases, has consistently 
claimed that it has standing only to assert the United States’ interest in the 
continued enforceability of its laws.184 Nor has the Supreme Court upheld 
executive standing to execute the President’s view of the Constitution; the 
Court has permitted the executive to bring suit or appeal only on behalf of 
the federal government.185  
But more fundamentally, taken to its logical conclusion, this argument 
would seem to remove all limits on executive power to refer constitutional 
questions to the federal judiciary. After all, the President might conclude 
that he could most “faithfully execute” the Constitution by simply asking 
the Supreme Court to declare invalid a law that (in the President’s view) is 
unconstitutional—before the executive enforces the law against anyone. In 
other words, a construction of the Take Care Clause sufficiently broad to 
authorize executive standing in nondefense cases would also seem to 
authorize the executive to seek advisory opinions. 
The better reading is that the executive has standing only to perform 
Article II duties that it cannot perform except through the Article III 
courts. Under this view, the executive’s power is broad but not unlimited. 
The executive has standing to enforce and defend federal law because it 
often can protect the government’s interest in the continued enforceability 
of its laws only by taking a case to an Article III court. By contrast, the 
executive can “faithfully execute” the Constitution without resort to an 
Article III court; the executive can refuse to enforce what it views as an 
unconstitutional law. Although the executive branch may find it useful—
and more politically palatable—to invoke federal jurisdiction to obtain a 
Supreme Court resolution of a constitutional question, the executive’s 
affirmative authority does not extend so far. 
In fact, there are good reasons to deny executive standing to seek such a 
Supreme Court settlement. First, the denial of standing would help protect 
the individuals subjected to further judicial process by the executive’s appeal. 
 
184 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
185 See supra Section I.A, subsection II.B.2. 
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Although there may be various interests at stake in a given nondefense 
case,186 if one assumes, as I do throughout this Article, that standing doctrine 
rests in part on the “case” or “controversy” requirement of Article III,187 one 
must consider the liberty of the individual (or individuals) involved in the 
particular case. As Chadha illustrates, these liberty interests can be substan-
tial. When the executive appeals, the other party not only shoulders the 
burden of additional litigation, but also faces the risk that the Supreme 
Court will reverse the lower court ruling protecting that party’s constitu-
tional rights. In Chadha, if the Supreme Court had upheld the legislative 
veto (as many scholars at the time believed it should),188 then the executive 
branch could have deported Chadha pursuant to the one-house order, even 
though the executive itself viewed the deportation as both unwise and 
unconstitutional, and even though Chadha had obtained one federal court 
ruling in his favor.189 Denying executive standing in nondefense cases 
would prevent the executive from imposing such costs on individuals solely 
to obtain a Supreme Court resolution of a constitutional question. 
Second, and more fundamentally, restricting executive standing would 
protect the federal judiciary. Standing doctrine and other justiciability tests, 
such as the rule against advisory opinions, are designed in large measure to 
 
186 For example, the executive may seek to protect third parties not before the court by ob-
taining a constitutional ruling against a federal statute. In Windsor, although the executive 
arguably harmed equality principles in the short term by enforcing DOMA, it sought to protect 
those interests in the long term by obtaining a definitive Supreme Court ruling that would likely 
prevent the enforcement of DOMA by any President. I do not deny the importance of those 
third-party interests. But I believe that standing doctrine serves to protect other interests—
namely, those of the individual(s) involved in the case—by limiting the executive’s power to 
subject anyone to further judicial process solely to obtain a definitive Court ruling. Although some 
individuals may be willing participants in the litigation, the Supreme Court’s current view—that 
the executive may appeal in nondefense cases—does not depend on consent. 
187 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
188 See Bernard Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution—A Reexamination, 46 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 351, 351 (1978) (stating that, in the late 1970s, most scholars believed that the veto 
was constitutional). Furthermore, some lower courts had upheld the legislative veto. See, e.g., 
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1033, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (upholding the legislative veto in 
the Federal Salary Act of 1967, which permitted presidential recommendations for judicial salary 
increases to go into effect unless vetoed).  
189 The executive branch might ultimately have declined to enforce the one-house order. But 
in the litigation, the executive insisted that it would enforce the order, absent a judicial ruling 
directing otherwise. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939-40 (1983). Interestingly, there is 
another way Chadha might have escaped deportation. Chadha married an American citizen, so he 
might have been able to apply for permanent residency on that basis. See CRAIG, supra note 130, at 
140. But according to the Ninth Circuit, there was no guarantee that Chadha would obtain 
residency through marriage. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 417 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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protect the federal courts from becoming substitute fora for matters that 
could have been, but were not, resolved through the political process.190 As 
John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer have stated, such rules help safeguard “the 
judiciary’s credibility and reputation” by ensuring that it does not become 
embroiled “in every important political or constitutional controversy.”191 
Nondefense cases raise this concern; the executive’s primary goal in appeal-
ing such cases is to refer controversial issues to the judiciary, particularly to 
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the denial of executive standing in such 
cases would limit its capacity to call on the judiciary to settle legal ques-
tions.  
Notably, this restriction on executive standing to appeal would likely 
protect not only the Supreme Court but the entire federal judiciary. As 
discussed, the executive has strong political and institutional incentives to 
ensure that constitutional issues receive not merely judicial review but 
Supreme Court settlement.192 The executive is thus unlikely to adopt a 
policy that would allow major constitutional questions to end at the district 
court level. The executive either would refuse to enforce a law that it 
viewed as unconstitutional (thereby preventing the issue from going to a 
federal district court), or it would ensure that it had standing to seek 
Supreme Court review—by defending the law on behalf of the United 
States. For these reasons, contrary to the assertion of some commenta-
tors,193 restricting executive standing should not interfere with the Supreme 
Court’s role in supervising the lower courts.194 
 
190 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (“Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation 
of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of ‘standing’ 
would be quite unnecessary.”). 
191 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutional-
izing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003-07 (2002). 
192 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Standing to Appeal and Executive Non-Defense of Federal Law After 
the Marriage Cases, 89 IND. L.J. 67, 87-88 (2014) (arguing that the standing ruling in Windsor was 
needed to ensure that the Court could provide “clear guidance to lower courts”). 
194 See infra Section IV.B (discussing further the executive’s incentives to secure Supreme 
Court review). For discussions of the Court’s “supervisory” role, see generally JAMES E. 
PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL 
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (2009); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, 
Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 685-707 (2012) (discussing the 
Court’s efforts to “superintend law declaration by other courts”). See also Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that the 
Court has long been viewed as having “a leading role in defining the content of federal law for 
the judiciary”).  
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Finally, it is important to recall that, absent standing to appeal in non-
defense cases, the executive could still advance its constitutional position 
through the political process by, for example, seeking repeal of or refusing 
to enforce a law that the President viewed as invalid. It seems reasonable to 
require the President to go through that political route, rather than through 
the judiciary. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Richardson in 
discussing private-party standing:  
[T]hat the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of 
course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the “ground 
rules” established by the Congress . . . . Lack of standing within the nar-
row confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his 
views in the political forum or at the polls.195 
Whether or not the Court properly applies this principle to private par-
ties,196 surely this message should apply to the President and other execu-
tive officials, who have far greater access to the political process than any 
private citizen. When the executive is “not satisfied with the ‘ground rules’ 
established by the Congress,” it has a “right to assert [its] views in the 
political forum.”197 The executive branch does not have an unqualified right 
to seek from the “judicial branch . . . a definitive verdict against [a] law’s 
constitutionality.”198  
III. CONGRESS’S (LACK OF) STANDING UNDER ARTICLE I 
Many scholars have suggested that Congress should be permitted to 
represent the federal government, at least in defense of federal law, when 
the executive branch is derelict in its duties. But these commentators have 
largely overlooked the fact that, like the executive branch, Congress must 
have affirmative constitutional authority to invoke federal jurisdiction. The 
power of Congress to bring suit or appeal in federal court does not come 
 
195 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
196 Some scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine on the ground that 
it relegates the wrong citizens to the political process. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of 
Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 486-88 (2008) (suggesting that the Court’s standing jurispru-
dence “tends to admit those who already have access to the political system, and reject those who 
lack such access”). I do not seek to enter that debate. My argument here is that the Richardson 
rationale should apply to the executive branch because it clearly does have access to the political 
process.  
197 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
198 Holder Letter, supra note 27. 
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from Article III. Instead, the scope and limits of congressional standing 
necessarily depend on a construction of the provisions conferring power on 
Congress—principally, those in Article I.199 I argue that the Constitution 
does not confer on Congress (or the House or the Senate) the power to 
enforce or defend federal law. Congress should not be permitted to exercise 
the discretion that necessarily accompanies standing to represent the United 
States in court. 
A. The Structural Case Against Legislative Standing 
There is currently no “congressional counsel.”200 In the 1970s, the House 
of Representatives established an Office of General Counsel, which 
“provid[es] legal assistance and representation to the House.”201 In 1978, 
Congress also created an Office of Senate Legal Counsel,202 which has the 
authority to participate in litigation “in the name of the Senate” or its 
subdivisions.203 Congress does not, however, appear to have granted 
standing to either the House or the Senate to represent the United States. 
That may explain why in Windsor no Justice considered whether the 
House, which sought to defend DOMA, had standing to assert the govern-
ment’s interest in the continued enforceability of that federal law. Although 
the majority opted not to rule on the House’s standing,204 Justices Alito and 
Scalia debated whether the House had “Article III standing” to appeal the 
 
199 See U.S. CONST. art. I; infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
200 For a discussion of the development of the House and Senate counsel (and the failed 
effort to create a congressional counsel), see generally Grove & Devins, supra note 12. 
201 Rules of the House of Representatives, R. II(8), 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf; see also id. (“There is established an Office of 
General Counsel for the purpose of providing legal assistance and representation to the 
House. . . . [The counsel] shall function pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall 
consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which shall include the majority and minority 
leaderships.”). 
202 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, §§ 701–717, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 
1875-85 (1978) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 288–288n (2012)). 
203 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2012) (“When directed to do so [by Senate resolution], the Counsel 
shall intervene or appear as amicus curiae in the name of the Senate, or in the name of an officer, 
committee, [or] subcommittee . . . of the Senate in any legal action . . . in which the powers 
and responsibilities of Congress . . . are placed in issue.”). Notably, the statute reflects Con-
gress’s own assumption that the Senate’s standing depends only upon Article III. See id. (“The 
Counsel shall be authorized to intervene only if standing to intervene exists under . . . article III 
of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
204 The Court decided that such a ruling was unnecessary, since it concluded (incorrectly, in 
my view) that the executive had standing to seek Supreme Court review. United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). 
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lower court decision striking down DOMA.205 Justice Alito insisted that the 
House did have standing, reasoning that the lower court decision “im-
pair[ed] Congress’ legislative power” and thereby “injured” the House,206 
while Justice Scalia, in turn, denied that the House could assert such an 
“institutional injury.”207 Thus, the Justices debated the House’s standing to 
protect its institutional interests, rather than the well-recognized interests 
of the federal government. 
It is doubtful that Congress would have standing to assert an “institu-
tional injury” arising out of the invalidation of a federal statute. As we have 
seen, the Supreme Court has never allowed the executive branch to assert 
such an injury and strongly suggested in Raines v. Byrd that neither the 
executive nor the legislature may assert an “institutional” interest in the 
constitutionality of a law.208 For now, however, I bracket the issue of what 
types of “institutional injuries” might be judicially cognizable209 (as well as 
 
205 See id. at 2712 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Our precedents make clear that . . . BLAG 
must demonstrate that it had Article III standing [to appeal].”). “BLAG” is the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group, which directs the House counsel’s actions. See supra note 201. 
206 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that “because legislating 
is Congress’ central function, any impairment of that function is a . . . grievous injury,” and that 
“in the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act of Congress and the 
Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress . . . has standing to defend the undefended 
statute”). 
207 See id. at 2703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the “impairment of a branch’s 
powers alone” does not “confer[] standing”).  
208 521 U.S. 811, 814, 821, 829-30 (1997) (holding that six legislators lacked standing to assert 
an “institutional injury” caused by the Line-Item Veto Act). Significantly, the Court in Raines 
“attach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the legislators were] not . . . authorized to 
represent their respective Houses of Congress in th[e] action, and indeed both Houses actively 
oppose[d] their suit.” Id. at 829-30. But the Court expressly declined to decide whether the 
legislators could have brought the challenge with their chambers’ support. Id. At a minimum, the 
Court’s reasoning casts doubt on claims of “institutional injury.” 
209 There may be some institutional interests that can only be enforced through the judici-
ary, such as the (long recognized) power of the House and the Senate to subpoena witnesses in 
connection with congressional investigations and to go to court to enforce those subpoenas. As 
Neal Devins and I have detailed in separate work, the power of the House and Senate to enforce 
subpoenas (and other internal rules) is the only “enforcement power” that the Constitution confers 
on any part of Congress. See Grove & Devins, supra note 12, at 573-74. This power stems from the 
constitutional provision authorizing each chamber to establish and enforce the “Rules of its 
Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Each chamber has long used this power to investi-
gate wrongdoing by the executive and others, to subpoena documents and testimony in connection 
with those investigations, and to hold third parties in “contempt” if they fail to comply with a 
subpoena. See Grove & Devins, supra note 12, at 574-75. To make this constitutional power 
effective, the House and the Senate must at times invoke federal jurisdiction to enforce subpoenas 
against third parties. Federal courts thus have good reason to uphold standing in such cases. See id. 
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any concerns about the statutory authority of the House or Senate counsel) 
and consider the question scholars have raised: whether Congress could 
create some kind of “congressional counsel” with standing to represent the 
federal government in court.210 
As we have seen, Article III clearly grants the federal courts jurisdiction 
over cases and controversies involving the “United States.”211 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the United States has judicially cog-
nizable interests in the enforcement and continued enforceability of its 
laws.212 One could envision a constitutional scheme under which various 
institutions, including the legislature, might be authorized to represent the 
government’s sovereign interests in court; indeed, the Supreme Court has 
found that, under the laws of some states, “legislators have standing to 
contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional.”213 I argue, 
however, that the federal Constitution does not confer such authority on 
Congress or its components.214 
No provision of the Constitution appears to give Congress the power to 
bring suit to enforce or defend federal statutes.215 Instead, the Constitution 
 
at 627-28; see also Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-1332, 2013 WL 
5428834, at *16-17 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (upholding a House committee’s standing to enforce a 
subpoena against the Attorney General); Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 
v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that “the House has standing to 
invoke the federal judicial power to aid its investigative function”). It is not clear whether an 
analogous argument could be made for the executive—that is, whether there are any “institutional 
interests” that the executive could vindicate only through the courts.  
210 See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 16, at 1248 (arguing that Congress has standing to defend 
statutes on behalf of the United States); Greene, supra note 16, at 596 (“Congress could pass a 
statute authorizing the Senate or House Counsel, or counsel representing both houses jointly, to 
litigate . . . on behalf of the United States . . . .”).  
211 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
212 See supra Sections I.B–C. 
213 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“We have recog-
nized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitu-
tional if state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s interests.” (citing Karcher v. May, 
484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987))).  
214 Notably, I assert that a prohibition on congressional standing can be inferred from spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution: the provisions enumerating the mechanisms by which 
Congress may influence law implementation—statutory enactment, the impeachment of federal 
officers, and the Senate’s role in appointments. I thereby rely on a well-established interpretive 
canon: expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes others). See 
David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927-29 
(1992) (discussing this canon). I do not assert that congressional standing simply violates general 
separation of powers principles. For a powerful critique of such theories, see Manning, supra note 
13, at 1944 (arguing that “the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of powers” 
that should be judicially enforced). 
215 Congress’s power is defined primarily by Article I. But other provisions of the Constitu-
tion also confer power on Congress. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (empowering 
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carefully separates the enactment of federal law from its execution,216 
specifying only three respects in which any part of Congress may play a role 
in law implementation. First, the Senate has the power to confirm (or 
reject) high-ranking executive officers nominated by the President.217 
Second, Congress may specify the duties of executive officials through laws 
enacted via bicameralism and presentment.218 Finally, Congress has the 
power to remove executive officers through impeachment.219 Congress may 
not, however, confer upon itself the power to execute federal law. 
The Supreme Court has “strictly enforced” this structural principle sep-
arating law enactment from implementation.220 For example, in Bowsher v. 
Synar and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the 
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, the Court emphasized that “agents of Congress” 
may not exercise executive or administrative functions.221 Nor may Con-
gress control those implementing federal law—outside the appointment, 
statutory, and removal mechanisms specified in the Constitution. In Buckley 
v. Valeo, the Court held that Congress may not “vest in itself, or in its 
 
Congress to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property” of the United States); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, amend. XIV, § 5, amend. 
XV, § 2 (together conferring on Congress the “power to enforce . . . by appropriate legislation” 
the Reconstruction Amendments). These provisions all appear to give Congress additional 
legislative power. None seems to give Congress any direct role in executing federal law (through 
litigation or otherwise). 
216 This strict separation of legislative and executive powers was a reaction to negative expe-
riences with the constitutional structures of Britain, the state governments, and the Articles of 
Confederation. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1717 (2012); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: 
Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1273 (2006). 
217 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
218 See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
219 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3, cl. 6. 
220 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 648-49 (1996) (observing that the Court has “strictly 
enforced the principle that Congress cannot directly participate in the implementation of 
Congress’s own laws”); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 114-15 (1994) (noting similarly that the Court consistently 
invalidates statutes in which “Congress attempted to give itself a degree of ongoing authority over 
the administration of the laws”). 
221 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985 insofar as it granted the Comptroller General, an agent of Congress, 
executive functions); Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 501 U.S. 252, 255, 276 (1991) (invalidating a 
statute that gave a “Board of Review” staffed by members of Congress “veto power” over certain 
administrative decisions and stating that “[i]f the power is executive, the Constitution does not 
permit an agent of Congress to exercise it”). 
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officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United States”222 and thus 
invalidated provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act that permitted 
members of Congress to select FEC commissioners.223 In Chadha, the 
Court struck down the one-house legislative veto, concluding that Congress 
may direct the executive’s implementation of federal law only through 
statutes enacted via bicameralism and presentment.224 And, in Bowsher, the 
Court concluded that impeachment was the exclusive mechanism by which 
Congress could remove executive officials, stating that “[t]he Constitution 
does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of 
officers charged with the execution of the laws.”225 
The Court has also made clear that Congress may not rely on its author-
ity under the Necessary and Proper Clause to transfer executive powers to 
itself.226 For example, in Bowsher, the Court declined to defer to “Congress’ 
judgment that the delegation” of executive functions to an agent of Con-
gress was “‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of the powers granted the 
Federal Government by the Constitution.”227 The Court declared: “[T]he 
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is 
contrary to the Constitution.”228 “The structure of the Constitution does 
not permit Congress to execute the laws . . . .”229 
The enforcement and defense of federal statutes are key components of 
the execution of federal law. That is why the executive branch has standing 
to assert the federal government’s interests in court. As we have seen, in 
order to faithfully execute federal law consistent with due process princi-
ples, the executive often must bring criminal and civil enforcement actions 
against alleged violators. The executive also has an obligation to defend 
most—if not all—federal laws to ensure their continued enforceability. 
Congress, by contrast, has no constitutional license analogous to the Take 
 
222 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976). 
223 See id. at 109-13, 143-44. 
224 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953-54, 959 (1983). 
225 478 U.S. at 722-23, 736. 
226 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 134-35, 138-39 (holding that congressional appointment of 
executive officials could not be justified as a “necessary” and “proper” means of regulating federal 
elections because “Congress’ power under [the Necessary and Proper] Clause is inevitably 
bounded by the express language” of the Appointments Clause). 
227 The dissenting opinion urged such deference. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dis-
senting); see also id. (“The Act vesting budget-cutting authority in the Comptroller General 
represents Congress’ judgment that the delegation of such authority . . . is ‘necessary and 
proper’ . . . and the President’s approval of the statute signifies his unwillingness to reject the 
choice made by Congress.”). 
228 478 U.S. at 736 (majority opinion) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944). 
229 Id. at 726. 
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Care Clause that empowers it to enforce or defend federal statutory 
commands in court. Accordingly, there is no basis for such congressional 
standing. 
Some readers may object to my treatment of enforcement and defense 
as two sides of the same coin, which both form part of law “execution.” In 
fact, a few scholars have recently asserted that the defense of federal 
statutes is not an executive function—or at least that it is not a sufficiently 
“core” executive function as to preclude the involvement of Congress.230 
Under this view, even if Congress lacks the Article I power to enforce laws 
through criminal or civil actions, it may still defend those laws in court. 
Thus, Brianne Gorod writes, “Defending [a] law . . . does not focus on the 
operation of the law and generally will not affect its operation at 
all. . . . [T]he Executive simply provides the court with its understanding 
of what the Constitution requires and . . . why the law at issue is con-
sistent with it.”231 Accordingly, when the executive declines to defend a law, 
“someone else can explain to the court why the statute should be upheld.”232 
Regardless of whether one can analytically separate “defense” from “exe-
cution” for some purposes, such an argument is insufficient in the context of 
legislative standing. Standing is not simply the privilege to go to court and 
make legal arguments. That role can be performed by amici curiae once a 
case is already before a court. Standing is the authority to invoke a court’s 
jurisdiction and thereby subject others to judicial process, at trial or on 
appeal. 
Furthermore, this argument overlooks why the executive branch itself 
has standing to defend federal laws and thus to appeal decisions invalidating 
those laws. The executive branch does not have standing merely to offer its 
views on a constitutional question or to seek a Supreme Court resolution of 
the question. The executive has standing because, absent an appeal, the law 
can no longer be enforced against (at least) the parties to that case. Thus, 
the executive had standing in Gonzales v. Raich to protect the continued 
enforceability of the Controlled Substances Act in cases involving     
 
230 See Gorod, supra note 16, at 1248 (arguing that “defending a law in court” is not “the same 
as executing the law”); see also Greene, supra note 16, at 591-92 (asserting that, in cases of executive 
nonenforcement, if Congress brings suit against the executive to obtain a declaratory judgment on 
the constitutionality of a law, Congress is not “controlling the execution of law”). Justice Alito 
seemed to make a similar assumption in Windsor. See infra note 238. 
231 Gorod, supra note 16, at 1219-20. 
232 Id. at 1220-21; see also id. (noting that “the law remains in operation” as long as the execu-
tive continues to enforce it). 
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homegrown marijuana.233 Likewise, in the state sovereign immunity cases, 
the executive intervened to protect the power of private citizens to enforce 
federal statutory commands against unconsenting states.234 In sum, the 
executive has standing because it generally has an Article II power and duty 
to protect the federal government’s interests in the enforcement and 
continued enforceability of federal law. 
Accordingly, for Congress to have similar standing to defend federal 
law, it must also have affirmative authority to assert the federal govern-
ment’s interest in the continued enforceability of its laws. But no provision 
of Article I or any other part of the Constitution appears to give Congress 
any such affirmative authority. On the contrary, the constitutional text and 
structure seem to preclude Congress from playing any direct role in law 
execution. 
The Supreme Court overlooked these structural concerns entirely in 
Chadha, when it permitted the House and Senate counsel to intervene to 
defend the statute authorizing the legislative veto.235 Significantly, the 
Chadha Court did not hold that the House or the Senate had Article III 
standing to appeal the Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the law—either 
on behalf of the federal government or otherwise.236 The Court did not 
need to address that issue because it held (incorrectly, in my view) that the 
executive could appeal the lower court ruling.237 
But some scholars and jurists, including Justice Alito in Windsor, have 
construed Chadha to permit congressional standing to defend federal laws 
because of the following assertion238: “We have long held that Congress is 
the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of 
government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with 
plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”239 As Neal 
Devins and I have detailed elsewhere, however, there is no such history. 
 
233 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.  
234 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
235 See 462 U.S. 919, 939-40 (1983) (“Congress is both a proper party to defend the constitu-
tionality of § 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).”).  
236 The Court focused on adverseness, finding that the presence of the House and Senate 
counsel overcame any “prudential” concerns raised by the executive’s agreement with Chadha’s 
constitutional arguments. See id. 
237 Id. at 930-31. 
238 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714 & n.3 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that any contention that “the Constitution confers on the President alone the authority 
to defend federal law in litigation” is “contrary to the Court’s holding in Chadha” and that Buckley 
“is not to the contrary[ because t]he Court’s statements there concerned enforcement, not 
defense”); Gorod, supra note 16, at 1249 (mentioning Chadha as one of repeated instances where 
Congress’s ability to participate in litigation has been recognized). 
239 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940. 
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Prior to Chadha, members of Congress had occasionally participated as 
amici curiae to defend federal laws.240 For example, the House of Repre-
sentatives appointed a Special Counsel to appear as amicus in defense of the 
rider in Lovett.241 But the Court did not authorize intervention by any 
component of Congress until Chadha. Given the lack of historical support 
for the Court’s assertion,242 and the fact that the Court did not even hold 
that the House or the Senate had standing to appeal, this one-sentence 
declaration in Chadha provides scant support for congressional standing to 
represent the federal government in court. 
Notably, a denial of congressional standing does not prevent Congress 
from objecting to the manner in which the executive represents the federal 
government’s interests. Congress may raise its concerns in a variety of 
ways, including public criticism, oversight hearings, the appropriations 
power, and (at the extreme) impeachment.243 That political process may not 
always lead to results that satisfy all members of Congress. Nevertheless, 
“[s]low, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the [political] process may 
be thought at times,”244 that is the mechanism by which the Constitution 
allows Congress to do battle with a recalcitrant executive. The Constitution 
does not grant Congress the affirmative authority to replace the executive as 
the government’s representative in court. 
 
240 See Grove & Devins, supra note 12, at 578, 586-93 (discussing the participation of mem-
bers of Congress as amici curiae in legal disputes over the pocket veto, the removal power, and the 
rider in Lovett). 
241 89 CONG. REC. 10,882 (1943). Indeed, that is one of the reasons the Solicitor General 
filed the certiorari petition in Lovett; as amicus, the Special Counsel could not appeal the Court of 
Claims’ decision. See Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the Court of Claims, supra note 124, at 12-
13. Of course, I argue that the executive also lacked standing to seek review in Lovett, given its 
refusal to defend the rider. 
242 Notably, the Court did not supply a basis for its assertion that there was a “long” history 
of congressional defense of statutes. The Court cited only two cases—Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 
U.S. 206 (1968), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940. But 
Cheng Fan Kwok did not involve Congress at all; instead, the Court invited private counsel to 
appear as amicus curiae to present an alternative interpretation of the statutory provision at issue 
because the INS agreed with the construction of the deportee. See 392 U.S. at 210 & n.9. In Lovett, 
of course, the House participated only as amicus. See 328 U.S. at 304. 
243 See Grove & Devins, supra note 12, at 597-603 (discussing the power of the House and 
the Senate to conduct investigations of the executive); supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text 
(discussing congressional oversight). 
244 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
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B. The Normative Case Against Legislative Standing 
My argument against congressional standing to represent the United 
States rests primarily on the constitutional text and structure, as well as 
Supreme Court precedent denying Congress a direct role in law execution. 
At the same time, I believe there are strong normative reasons to prohibit 
Congress from transferring to itself the power to represent the federal 
government in court. Even if Congress had statutory standing only to 
defend federal laws, it would have immense discretion. No one, to my 
knowledge, contends that a congressional counsel would have a “duty to 
defend” every law or to appeal every lower court decision invalidating a 
law. Indeed, given the number of federal laws that are subject to constitu-
tional challenge, any such duty would make the task of a congressional 
counsel infeasible—unless Congress created a second “Department of 
Justice” for the legislative branch. Advocates of congressional defense 
instead envision a counsel that would step in only when Congress concluded 
that the executive branch was derelict in its duties—by, for example, 
refusing to defend a law or offering what legislators perceived to be a less-
than-enthusiastic defense.245 
But absent a duty to defend in every case, the congressional counsel 
would have immense discretion to invoke federal jurisdiction, comparable to 
the discretion exercised by the executive under the intervention statute.246 
Such a discretionary power raises many of the same concerns as executive 
discretion. First, like the executive branch, Congress has strong incentives 
to refer controversial constitutional questions to the judiciary.247 For 
 
245 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for 
Congress: Protecting Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131, 147 (1993) (observing 
that the House and the Senate counsel have sometimes participated in litigation, even when the 
executive defended the federal law, if they perceived that the executive was “equivocating in its 
support” of the statute). 
246 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2012). Indeed, early in the DOMA litigation, the House attempted to 
rely on § 2403 as a basis for intervention; the district court rejected that claim on statutory 
grounds. See Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the 
statute only applies when the United States or an agency is not “already a party to the litigation”). 
247 Congress may, like the President, seek to advance a particular political agenda through 
the judiciary. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their 
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512-13, 516-17 
(2002) (discussing the efforts of the Republican Party in the nineteenth century to use the 
judiciary to advance a pro-business agenda); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empower-
ment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 91, 116 (2000) (arguing that political leaders will empower the judiciary if they believe 
“the judiciary in general and the supreme court in particular are likely to produce decisions 
that . . . reflect their ideological preferences”); see also John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. 
Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the 
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example, the Windsor decision relieved not only the executive branch but 
also members of Congress—at least those who believed that DOMA was 
unconstitutional and inflicting considerable harm on same-sex couples—
from having to seek the law’s repeal.248 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of DOMA also took political pressure off other members of 
Congress, who might not have supported a law repealing DOMA but who 
did not want to expend political capital attempting to protect an increasing-
ly unpopular statute.249 Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that 
Congress, like the executive branch, would exercise its discretion to “invite 
the judiciary to resolve those political controversies that [legislators] cannot 
or would rather not address” themselves.250 
Second, this restriction on congressional standing protects not only the 
judiciary but also the liberty of individuals who could be subjected to judicial 
 
Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 458-60 (1996) (showing that Congress tends to expand the 
size of the judiciary when “the enacting House, Senate, and president and the nominating 
president and confirming Senate” are politically aligned). Congress may also seek to defer to the 
courts on controversial political questions. See Graber, supra note 23, at 36 (arguing that “prominent 
elected officials consciously invite the judiciary to resolve” contentious issues); Keith E. Whitting-
ton, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United 
States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 584 (2005) (“The establishment and mainte-
nance of judicial review is a way of delegating some kinds of political decisions to a relatively 
politically insulated institution.”). 
248 Notably, a group of Democratic Senators had introduced a bill to repeal DOMA. See 157 
CONG. REC. S1754 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (introducing the Respect 
for Marriage Act of 2011 in order to repeal DOMA); id. at S1753-54 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
(arguing that “under DOMA, the Federal government does not treat people equally or fairly”). 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor, which was supported by many members of Congress, 
ended that political battle. See Kathleen Hennessey, Democrats File Amicus Brief Challenging Defense 
of Marriage Act, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/03/news/la-pn-
house-democrats-doma-20111103 (observing that 133 House Democrats filed briefs in the DOMA 
litigation arguing that the law was invalid).  
249 See KLARMAN, supra note 145, at 161 (noting that by March 2011, polls showed that 
Americans opposed DOMA by fifty-one percent to thirty-four percent and increasingly supported 
same-sex marriage, and asserting that because of this changing political landscape, “the overall 
Republican response to the administration’s [nondefense of] DOMA was far more muted than it 
likely would have been just a couple of years earlier”); John Parkinson, House Dems Tweet 
Jubilation, GOP Silent After DOMA Struck Down, ABC NEWS ( June 26, 2013), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/house-dems-tweet-rxn-to-doma-gop-silent (describing the 
reaction of House Republicans to the Windsor decision as “muted”); Jake Sherman & Ginger 
Gibson, GOP Leadership on DOMA: It’s Up to the States, POLITICO ( June 26, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/gay-marriage-supreme-court-decision-republican-response-
93423.html (explaining that, though some Republicans criticized the Windsor decision, Republican 
leaders sought to end the “same-sex marriage fight . . . on Capitol Hill” because “the political 
dynamics of gay rights and gay marriage are shifting”). 
250 Graber, supra note 23, at 36. 
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process by a congressional counsel.251 As noted, although a constitutional 
case may implicate various interests, given standing doctrine’s grounding in 
the case-or-controversy requirement, one must consider the liberty of the 
parties—or the potential parties—to the “case.”252 If Congress could 
represent the federal government in court (even if its role were limited to 
the defense of federal statutes), it would have the discretion to pick and 
choose which laws to defend and, more importantly, which cases to ap-
peal—and thus which individuals to subject to further judicial process. For 
example, when the House of Representatives appointed counsel to defend 
DOMA, Speaker John Boehner made clear that the House would not 
intervene in or appeal every case: “[E]ffectively defending [DOMA] does 
not require the House to intervene in every case, especially when doing so 
would be prohibitively expensive.”253 
As we have seen in the context of the executive branch, such discretion 
raises serious concerns about the arbitrary exercise of power. As Justice 
Jackson observed, when a government official can “choose his cases, it 
follows that he can choose” his opponents.254 “Therein [lies the] most 
dangerous power”: the power to “pick people” the official “thinks he should 
get,” rather than the cases that need to be litigated.255 Congress could decide 
to appeal (or not to appeal) a lower court decision for nefarious reasons—
because the opposing party is “unpopular with the predominant or govern-
ing group, . . . attached to the wrong political views, or . . . personally 
obnoxious” to members of Congress.256 
I am not suggesting that the House of Representatives was in fact moti-
vated by any improper purpose in pursuing the Windsor case rather than 
 
251 This analysis accords with those who emphasize that the separation of powers should be 
construed so as to protect individual liberty. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered 
Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (1991) (finding that the historical circumstances in which the 
Constitution was drafted support interpreting the separation of powers as a means of protecting 
individual rights); David A. Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 
307, 309-10 (1990) (arguing that interpreting the separation of powers as a way of protecting the 
prerogatives of the federal branches leads to arbitrary decisions and that a better approach focuses 
on the protection of individual rights). 
252 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
253 John Schwartz, A California Bankruptcy Court Rejects U.S. Law Barring Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A18 (statement of Brendan Buck, spokesman for Rep. Boehner); see 
also Chris Geidner, U.S. Trustee Withdraws Appeal of Gay Couple’s Bankruptcy Court DOMA Victory, 
METRO WEEKLY: POLIGLOT ( July 7, 2011), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/07/us-
trustee-withdraws-appeal-of.html (noting the House’s decision not to appeal a bankruptcy 
decision invalidating DOMA).  
254 Jackson, supra note 68, at 5. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
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other appeals. The constitutional concern is not with the exercise of discre-
tion in any particular case but with the risk created by largely unchecked 
discretion. Nor is it far-fetched to think that Congress might use broad 
discretionary power improperly. The facts underlying both Lovett and Chadha 
illustrate this point. In the 1940s, the House of Representatives was on a 
crusade to ferret out suspected communists from the federal government. 
One representative alleged that dozens of “crackpot, radical bureaucrats” had 
infiltrated the government,257 and after a hearing conducted only by the 
House, three were singled out for dismissal: “Goodwin B. Watson, William 
E. Dodd, . . . and Robert Morss Lovett.”258 In the 1970s, members of 
Congress were concerned that the executive branch was overly generous in 
granting suspensions of deportation and began to use the legislative veto 
more aggressively to overrule such suspensions.259 In 1975, a House sub-
committee concluded, “after reviewing 340 cases,” that Jagdish Chadha and 
five other undocumented immigrants “did not meet [the] statutory re-
quirements” for suspension of deportation.260 To this day, it is unclear why 
the House singled out Chadha and the others.261 
Although there may be good reasons to restrict executive discretion to 
enforce federal law or to intervene in defense of federal law, there is little 
basis for transferring that same discretionary power to Congress. Indeed, 
the constitutional separation between legislative and executive powers 
seems to have been designed in large part to prevent Congress from exercis-
ing such discretionary power. As James Madison stated in Federalist No. 47, 
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person 
or body . . . there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest 
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner.”262 
 
257 89 CONG. REC. 479 (1943) (statement of Rep. Dies); see also United States v. Lovett, 328 
U.S. 303, 308 (1946) (noting “the House of Representatives’ feeling in the late thirties that many 
‘subversives’ were occupying influential positions in the Government”). 
258 Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, § 304, Pub. L. No. 78-132, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943). 
259 See CRAIG, supra note 130, at 21, 23-24 (observing that the number of legislative vetoes in 
this context increased considerably in the 1960s and 1970s). 
260 121 CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975) (statement of Rep. Eilberg). 
261 See CRAIG, supra note 130, at 23 (observing that “no one then, or now, knows for sure 
what the reasoning was” behind the veto). 
262 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 251 ( James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (quoting Montesquieu). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE AND  
LEGISLATIVE STANDING 
Executive and legislative standing both depend on and are substantially 
constrained by Article II and Article I, respectively. This analysis has 
important implications for constitutional scholarship, particularly the 
ongoing debate over the executive’s “duty to defend” federal statutes, and 
for federal litigation on behalf of the United States. 
A. The (Overlooked) Connection Between Defense and Execution 
Many of the scholarly assumptions about executive and legislative 
standing depend upon the widespread view that the enforcement of federal 
statutes can be analytically separated from the defense of those statutes in 
court. Thus, even scholars who strongly dispute the scope of the executive’s 
“duty to enforce” federal laws agree that there is no “duty to defend.”263 For 
example, although Eugene Gressman insisted that “the President has no 
option under article II” but to faithfully execute every federal law, he also 
asserted that the executive always retains “the privilege of refusing to 
defend” a law in court.264 Dawn Johnsen advocates a less categorical ap-
proach to enforcement but asserts that the executive should enforce most 
federal laws, particularly if that is the only way to “create[] the opportunity 
for . . . Supreme Court” review.265 Professor Johnsen, however, also 
distinguishes defense from enforcement: “A decision not to defend a law 
raises vital questions of judgment, but not of potential constitutional 
transgression.”266 Finally, Neal Devins and Sai Prakash, who believe that 
the executive has a duty not to enforce any law that the President considers 
unconstitutional, assert that (at a minimum) the executive branch has a duty 
not to defend such a law.267 Professors Devins and Prakash acknowledge 
that executive enforcement of a law may be justified as a way to tee up a 
 
263 My review of the literature revealed that only two scholars (in one article) have argued 
that the executive’s duty to enforce also requires it to defend a law. See supra note 105. 
264 Gressman, supra note 102, at 382, 383 n.17 (citation omitted). Professor Gressman took a 
different position as a litigator. He served as counsel for the House of Representatives in Chadha 
and argued that both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the case, 
in large part because of the executive’s refusal to defend the statute. See Motion of Appellee U.S. 
House of Representatives to Dismiss, supra note 138 at 6-14; CRAIG, supra note 130, at 102-04 
(explaining that Gressman made a tactical decision “to emphasize the jurisdictional questions in an 
effort to persuade the court to dismiss the case”). 
265 Johnsen, supra note 15, at 51.  
266 Dawn Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality Rather 
than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 599, 610 (2012). 
267 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 509-10. 
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constitutional issue for judicial—and, ultimately, Supreme Court—
review.268 But they insist that there is no justification for further requiring 
the executive to defend the law in court: “[T]here simply is no duty to 
defend federal statutes the President believes are unconstitutional.”269 
Although the executive may have some discretion to decline to defend a 
law when another litigant invokes federal jurisdiction,270 the executive has 
no such discretion when it seeks to invoke the federal judicial power. As I 
have demonstrated, the executive has standing to appear in court on behalf 
of the United States—to assert the government’s interests in the enforce-
ment and continued enforceability of its laws. But the executive lacks 
standing when it fails to protect those interests—when it refuses to defend a 
law and instead seeks the law’s invalidation. 
Notably, the executive has never asserted an alternative basis for execu-
tive standing in nondefense cases. The executive has consistently claimed 
that it has standing to assert the injury to the United States caused by the 
lower court’s invalidation of a federal law. Thus, in Lovett, the Solicitor 
General sought Supreme Court review to determine “the liability of the 
United States” to the three employees.271 In Chadha, the Solicitor General 
contended that the executive was “aggrieved,” because the Ninth Circuit 
“order[ed] the Attorney General to ‘cease and desist from taking any steps 
to deport’” Chadha.272 And, in Windsor, the Solicitor General claimed that 
“[t]he United States may properly invoke th[e Supreme] Court’s jurisdic-
tion because the judgments of the courts below preclude enforcement of a 
federal statute.”273 But if the executive invokes federal jurisdiction on behalf 
of the United States, then it has standing only to redress the injury to the 
United States. The executive must ask the appellate court to uphold the 
 
268 Id. at 510; see also id. at 572 (“If one of the benefits of the current regime is that the 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, ultimately decide the constitutionality of legislation, that 
benefit is no less present in an enforce-but-not-defend regime.”). 
269 Id. at 509; see also Waxman, supra note 15, at 1078 n.14 (“Whatever objections one might 
make under the Take Care Clause to a practice of nonenforcement, those concerns are virtually 
nonexistent in the nondefense context . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
270 As discussed, I do not address this issue, which is distinct from any question of executive 
standing. Any such refusal to defend would not deprive the court of Article III jurisdiction. See 
supra subsection II.B.1. 
271 Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the Court of Claims, supra note 124, at 9. 
272 Reply Brief for the Appellant, supra note 139, at 3. 
273 Brief for the United States on Jurisdictional Questions, supra note 154, at 6. See also id. 
(“The United States thus satisfies . . . the Article III requirement that it be ‘injured,’ by a lower 
court’s decision.”). 
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federal law. In short, in order to have standing to appeal, the executive has a 
duty to defend. 
The assumption that “enforcement” can be separated from “defense” has 
also contributed to the widespread view that Congress has standing to 
defend federal laws on behalf of the United States.274 But the interest of the 
federal government is the continued enforceability of the relevant law. 
Congress lacks the affirmative power to assert that interest in court and, 
accordingly, lacks Article III standing. 
B. Practical Implications: Standing for the United States 
My arguments, of course, raise an important question. I contend that 
the executive lacks standing to appeal when it refuses to defend a law, and 
that Congress may not appeal in the executive’s stead. Moreover, there is 
currently no “independent counsel” who might step in to defend a law in 
place of the executive. (For now, I bracket the question whether Congress 
could create such a counsel with standing to appeal on behalf of the United 
States.275) That seems to leave a void: Who, if anyone, will represent the 
interests of the United States when its laws are struck down by a lower 
court? 
There are, however, good reasons to assume that such a void would not 
exist if the judiciary enforced these standing restrictions on the executive 
branch and the legislature. The executive would in most cases face immense 
political pressure to appeal and to defend federal laws on behalf of the 
United States.276 Both Congress and the President benefit from Supreme 
Court settlement of constitutional questions. This is in part because (as 
 
274 See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. 
275 The Supreme Court upheld the use of an independent counsel to prosecute certain viola-
tions of federal law, but did so only after concluding that the counsel was subject to some 
oversight and control by members of the executive branch. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 
695-96 (1988). This decision suggests that Congress may create some type of special counsel to 
defend federal laws. Given the Morrison Court’s emphasis on executive supervision, however, it is 
not clear whether Congress could create a counsel entirely “independent” of the executive branch. 
For now, I bracket that question and simply note that Congress’s power to delegate executive 
standing to represent the United States likely depends not only on Article III but also on Article II. 
276 The executive can be expected to face such political pressure whenever there is a dispute 
over the validity of the law at issue. There may, of course, be times when political actors agree 
that a law is unconstitutional. An example might be the law at issue in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital, which authorized construction grants for public and nonpublic hospitals, 
including those providing “separate-but-equal” facilities for different racial groups. 323 F.2d 959, 
961 (4th Cir. 1963). The executive intervened under 28 U.S.C. § 2403 to argue that the statute 
was clearly “unconstitutional” in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 
Simkins, 323 F.2d at 962. The Fourth Circuit agreed. See id. at 969-70. 
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social scientists have shown) any nationwide resolution of a legal question 
serves an important coordinating function; politicians and citizens benefit 
from knowing the rules of the game, even when they disagree with the 
“rules” chosen by the Supreme Court.277 The executive also benefits for a 
more practical reason. It would be both expensive and administratively 
cumbersome if some lower courts were to strike down a law, thereby 
prohibiting the executive from enforcing the law in certain parts of the 
country, while the executive continued to enforce it elsewhere. Accordingly, 
the executive has a strong incentive to seek a nationally uniform ruling from 
the Supreme Court. 
In theory, of course, the executive could itself provide that nationwide 
settlement. As discussed, the executive claims that it has the constitutional 
authority to refuse to enforce a federal law throughout the country when 
the President concludes that the law is invalid. But such unilateral action 
would be politically costly.278 These political costs help explain why the 
Carter, Reagan, and Obama Administrations opted to fight the legislative 
veto and DOMA in the courts rather than refuse to execute those laws 
nationwide. Therefore, I believe that the executive would generally seek a 
Supreme Court resolution of a constitutional question—even though it 
would have standing to do so only if it defended the law. Such an approach 
would enable the executive to obtain the benefits of a uniform settlement of 
federal law without having to take political responsibility for providing that 
settlement itself. 
Some scholars have suggested that the executive might not mount an 
adequate defense if the President considers a law to be unconstitutional.279 
 
277 Various scholars have emphasized the coordinating function of judicial decisions. See, e.g., 
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 108 (2009) (asserting that “[i]f the constitution is vague[,] . . . . [c]onstitutional 
review provides focal points for enforcement”); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, 
Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market (explaining how 
European courts help nations identify and monitor treaty violations), in IDEAS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173, 197-98 ( Judith Goldstein & 
Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). For discussions of the Supreme Court’s settlement function, see 
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 1359, 1385 (1997) (emphasizing the Court’s role “as the authoritative settler of constitutional 
meaning”); Grove, supra note 6, at 944 (asserting that, within the judiciary, “only the Supreme 
Court can provide a definitive and nationally uniform resolution of federal law”). 
278 For a discussion of the political costs, see supra note 183. 
279 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 572 (suggesting that the Solicitor General might 
offer “a tepid defense of a law, . . . admit[ting] its constitutional infirmities”); Peter L. Strauss, 
The President and Choices Not to Enforce, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 107, 
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But this argument overlooks the institutional culture and traditions of the 
Department of Justice. The DOJ often defends laws that the President 
deems invalid. For example, the George W. Bush Administration success-
fully defended campaign finance legislation that, in the President’s view, 
“present[ed] serious constitutional concerns.”280 Accordingly, there is good 
reason to expect that DOJ lawyers will properly present the position of the 
government—regardless of the President’s (or their own personal) views 
about the issue.281 The DOMA litigation illustrates this point. Some of the 
same attorneys who defended DOMA during the Bush and early Obama 
Administrations continued to represent the government after the executive 
switched sides—and helped to prepare the government briefs urging the 
courts to strike down the law.282 
Admittedly, the executive may decline to defend a federal law in at least 
some cases and thus, under the theory presented here, would lack standing 
to appeal. In that event, the federal government would have no representa-
tive in court to argue for the continued enforceability of the challenged 
law.283 For several reasons, however, I do not believe that such a result 
would be troublesome, particularly if it were limited to only a handful of 
cases. First, if Supreme Court review is desirable, the issue could likely still 
reach the Court; if a lower court upheld the law, a private litigant could 
seek Supreme Court review. For example, because some lower courts had 
upheld the legislative veto (and, given the academic consensus in favor of 
the veto at that time, more were likely to do so284), the executive did not 
need to appeal Chadha’s case to obtain a Supreme Court resolution. The 
executive subjected Chadha to further judicial process because it “viewed 
Chadha as a promising case for attacking the legislative veto.”285 Second, in 
the event that the executive refused to defend a law and every lower court 
agreed with that position and held the law unconstitutional, it is not clear 
 
119-20 (doubting that an oath-bound President would defend “with enthusiasm” a law that he 
considered unconstitutional). 
280 Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503, 
503 (Mar. 27, 2002); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 223-24 (2003). The government’s 
victory in McConnell was partially reversed by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
281 I base this assertion on my experience as a DOJ appellate litigator. See also Meltzer, supra 
note 10, at 1224-25 (making a similar observation based on his experience in the executive branch). 
282 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (showing attorney August 
E. Flentje representing the government in opposing DOMA); Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 
F.3d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 2006) (showing Flentje representing the government in supporting 
DOMA).  
283 Again, this argument assumes that there is no “independent counsel” to represent the 
United States. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
285 CRAIG, supra note 130, at 88. 
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why the matter would warrant Supreme Court review. In the DOMA 
litigation, once the Obama Administration argued that the law violated 
equal protection principles, every lower federal court to consider the issue 
struck down the law.286 Given that judicial consensus, the executive surely 
had a strong basis for ceasing to enforce DOMA nationwide—and thereby 
end the harm the statute was causing individuals like Edith Windsor. 
Although the executive wanted the Supreme Court to provide a nationwide 
settlement, the executive could have (and arguably should have) provided 
that settlement itself. 
Finally, it is important to consider the practical impact that a denial of 
executive standing would have on the individuals involved in the particular 
case. The denial of executive standing to appeal would mean that a citizen 
would no longer be subject to a law that, in the view of a lower court, 
violated her constitutional rights. Thus, the employees in Lovett could have 
recouped their salaries sooner; Jagdish Chadha would have been spared the 
threat of deportation years earlier; and Edith Windsor would have enjoyed 
the fruits of a lower court victory that validated her commitment to her 
same-sex spouse. In each case, the executive’s appeal, at a minimum, 
delayed (and could have overturned) those lower court victories against the 
government. Although the federal government has an important interest in 
the continued enforceability of its laws, surely private citizens also have a 
substantial interest in the vindication of their constitutional rights—sooner, 
rather than later. 
CONCLUSION 
Executive and legislative standing cannot be determined by Article III 
alone, but instead depend in large part on the provisions conferring power 
on those institutions—principally, Article II and Article I. This basic 
insight clarifies many questions about institutional standing. The Constitu-
tion does not grant Congress any power to represent the United States in 
federal court and instead directs the executive branch to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”287 But the Take Care Clause does not give the 
executive branch an unqualified right to invoke the judicial power. The 
executive has standing to assert the federal government’s interests in the 
 
286 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (holding the denial of federal benefits to lawfully married same-sex couples unconstitu-
tional); supra note 152 (noting the lower court rulings in Windsor). 
287 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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enforcement and continued enforceability of its laws. No provision of the 
Constitution, however, confers on the executive the power to invoke federal 
jurisdiction when it declines to defend a federal law. The executive lacks the 
affirmative power—and thus lacks Article III standing—to seek from the 
Supreme Court “a definitive verdict against [a] law’s constitutionality.”288 
 
 
288 Holder Letter, supra note 27. 
